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I. INTRODUCTION
The downtown branch of Citibank was robbed. The robber pro-
duced a note stating "Gemmie all the money silver too, or I'll hurt you."
Shortly after the robbery, Robert Harris was found hiding behind a truck
with dye on his hands and clothes (banks often conceal an exploding dye
pack within a package containing a small amount of cash to make appre-
hension and identification of bank robbers easier). Harris was charged
with bank robbery and assigned counsel.
While exploring possible defenses and other options with defense
counsel, Harris explained that he was the "look out" and that "John"
actually went inside the bank. It was John's idea to rob the bank
because they needed the money. Harris' lawyer told him that the FBI's
report indicated that Harris was apprehended hiding near the bank, that
there was no one else around, and that the handwriting on the note was
not Harris'. Harris confessed that John wrote the note before disappear-
ing from the scene, but that John would return. Harris also expressed his
wish to plead guilty because he was merely the look out, and that John
had told him that if Harris got caught, he should plead guilty. Harris'
attorney explained that pleading guilty to bank robbery could result in a
lengthy jail sentence. This was especially probable because the judge
assigned to the case was notorious for imposing lengthy sentences. This
probability did not matter to Harris because he believed he would not
spend a long time in jail. After ensuring that no one but his lawyer was
listening, he proceeded to tell an extraordinary story.
Harris explained that he witnessed the planning of the assassination
of President Kennedy and had been pursued by the conspirators, the
government, or both, ever since. He believed he knew the identity of at
least one of his pursuers-John, the same person with whom Harris
claimed to be involved in the robbery. Harris did not know John's last
name and could not positively identity the other conspirators; he thought
they might work for the government, but he was not sure. He said that
periodic conversations with John indicated that John might know where
the conspirators could be found, but refused to disclose additional infor-
mation about the conspiracy. The defense attorney tried to determine
whether "John" really existed, and if so, his whereabouts. Harris, saying
he did not want to get John "in trouble," refused to offer any other infor-
mation about John.
When asked by his attorney why he thought he would not spend a
long time in prison, Harris replied that if the government was not
involved in the assassination conspiracy, it would quickly release him
from jail because he was the only person who could identify and locate
the conspirators. Alternatively, if the government did participate in the
[Vol. 52:529
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conspiracy, he would be killed in prison. Thus, the length of the prison
sentence was of no consequence. Harris instructed his attorney not to
tell anyone of their conversation.
After an investigation, the defense attorney could not confirm the
existence of "John." Neither the FBI agents who arrested Harris nor the
people present at the bank knew that anyone other than Harris was
involved in the robbery. They insisted that Harris had acted alone. Har-
ris' sister (the only family he had) said that Harris once had a friend
named "John" many years ago, but that she did not know how to locate
him because he had been in and out of jail. Being several years younger
than Harris and having been out of touch with her brother for many
years, the sister was unable to accurately report on his childhood or pro-
vide helpful information.
With Harris' consent and without disclosing her client's statements,
defense counsel retained a forensic psychiatrist to examine Harris.
However, during the examination, Harris did not discuss the conspiracy
or "John." After discussing the consequences of being found incompe-
tent with his attorney, Harris said he did not want to be in a "loony bin."
The psychiatrist reported to the court that Harris understood the charges;
understood the roles of the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, and jury;
understood his rights; comprehended the consequences of being con-
victed; and that Harris wanted to plead guilty because he was guilty.
The psychiatrist found Harris competent. Thus, the court, having no
additional information on which to base a contrary conclusion, con-
firmed the expert's report.
This example, neither fictional nor extremely unusual, illustrates
the kind of information that may be possessed solely by defense counsel.
It further exemplifies the potentially harmful consequences of non-dis-
closure, and the difficulties faced by criminal defense counsel represent-
ing clients such as Harris.'
Attorneys who represent possibly incompetent defendants charged
with criminal conduct face difficult ethical issues, implicating profes-
sional duties of loyalty, zealous representation, and confidentiality-as
an ethical question and as a matter of the law of evidence. The princi-
ples of agency underlying the attorney-client relationship are also impli-
cated when the defendant's capacity is in doubt. In the ordinary
criminal case, the client has at least implicitly authorized his lawyer's
1. This Article focuses on competence in criminal cases because such situations permit
examination of the attorney-client relationship in a discrete setting. While this Article
concentrates on the criminal defendant, there are important similarities to the attorney's role in
representing impaired clients in civil cases, particularly those in which the state is the plaintiff.
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conduct.2 But if the defendant is impaired, the client may not have the
mental capacity to authorize the attorney's actions.3
Defense counsel representing the possibly incompetent criminal
defendant will often be the only one with relevant information about her
client's incapacity. This information, related in confidence, may suggest
that the client has difficulty in rationally understanding the charges
against him and cannot assist his counsel.4 Under current rules, limited
options are available to the defense attorney. She is required to alert the
court to the possibility that her client is incompetent,' but the attorney-
client privilege, ethical rules,6 and the criminal defense attorney's role,
as presently understood, do not allow the attorney to disclose her client's
confidences.' This prohibition results in trials or in guilty pleas by
defendants who may not be competent to proceed, thus, violating due
process.' Such an outcome is contrary to the fundamental values of jus-
tice in our criminal adversary system.
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 38, 39 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 20-21 (1958).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1958); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) ("Because the relationship of client and
lawyer is one of principal and agent, principles of agency law might operate to suspend or
terminate the lawyer's authority to act when a client becomes incompetent .... ") (citing In re
Houts, 499 P.2d 1276 (1972)) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 96-404].
4. Clients who function at some level while having difficulty rationally understanding and
assisting defense counsel, which suggests incompetence, are the focus of this article.
Representation of these clients may pose more serious ethical issues than the representation of
indisputably incompetent clients. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism:
Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 31 UTAH L. REv. 515, 519 n.17
(1987) (noting that in civil matters involving plainly nonfunctioning individuals, the attorney-
client relationship may be established through a proper proxy consent or a court order).
5. See infra Part II.
6. The phrase "ethical rules" refers jointly to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility when their individual differences are
not relevant. The Model Rules, sometimes with modifications, has been adopted in thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia. The Model Code is in force in fewer than fifteen states.
Many of the Model Rules, however, closely parallel their counterparts in the Model Code.
7. See infra Part IV. Recently, the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York issued a report, A Delicate Balance: Ethical Rules
for Those Who Represent Incompetent Clients, which recommends the addition of a new
disciplinary rule that would permit attorneys to protect a client whom the lawyer reasonably
believes "cannot adequately" act in his own interest. See Comm. on Professional Responsibility,
A Delicate Balance: Ethical Rules for Those Who Represent Incompetent Clients, 52 THE REC. OF
rm ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crr OF N.Y. 34, 42-43 (1997) [hereinafter A Delicate Balance].
The Committee further urges the approval of a new subdivision to Model Code DR 4-101 that
would permit attorneys to reveal "confidences and secrets to the extent necessary to seek judicial
or professional assistance for a client whom the attorney reasonably believes cannot act in the
client's own best interest ...... Id. at 44. While the report recognized the importance of
permitting disclosure of client confidences, by addressing only the ethical rule and not the
attorney-client privilege, it did not go far enough.
8. See infra notes 285-94 and accompanying text.
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This Article argues that the importance of competence to the proper
functioning of the adversary system requires that the criminal defense
attorney be permitted to disclose client statements for the purpose of
determining incompetence. Part II reviews Medina v. California,9 in
which the Supreme Court suggested that a criminal defense attorney
could testify about a client's competency at competency hearings. Part
III explores the legal standard of competency, its application to the crim-
inal defendant, and the elusiveness of the concept of rationality. Part IV
examines the attorney-client relationship. Part V discusses the attorney-
client privilege and the ethical rules relative to competency proceedings.
Finally, Part VI argues that an exception to the attorney-client privilege
and the ethical rules is warranted in order to permit the criminal defense
attorney to disclose client confidences which impact the client's compe-
tence and explores the implications of this exception.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY TO THE
COMPETENCY DETERMINATION
Courts and attorneys regularly confront difficult problems concern-
ing possibly incompetent criminal defendants.'° Conflicts arise between
client competency, which is indispensable to the criminal justice sys-
tem, 1 and the rules requiring confidentiality, loyalty, and zealous repre-
sentation-essential features of our adversary system. The importance
of not prosecuting incompetent defendants is pitted against the ethical
rules and the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, preventing disclosure
of client confidences evidencing incompetence could result in the con-
viction of an incompetent defendant.
A. Medina v. California
Traditional notions of confidentiality and perceptions of the role of
the criminal defense attorney have presented obstacles to defense coun-
sel participating in competency proceedings. Yet, Medina v. Califor-
nia" signaled the prospect of significant changes in the role of attorneys
representing the possibly incompetent criminal defendant, the parame-
9. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
10. One study indicated that defense counsel in felony cases doubted their client's
competence in 14.8% of their cases and referred 8.2% of their clients for evaluation. Steven K.
Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decision-Making in Criminal Cases: Client Competence and
Participation as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 385, 392 (1992). In a
subsequent study, it was found that attorneys doubted their client's competence in about 10% of
the cases. Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and Make Decisions in
Criminal Cases, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 437, 450 (1994).
11. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376 (1996); Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975).
12. 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (holding that due process was not violated by a state statute that
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ters of the attorney-client privilege in such cases, and the ethical rules
implicated. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, said:
Although an impaired defendant might be limited in his ability to
assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence, the defendant's inabil-
ity to assist counsel can, in and of itself, constitute probative evidence
of incompetence, and defense counsel will often have the best-
informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his
defense. 13
Suggesting that the defense attorney has "the best-informed view"' 4 of
her client's competence is intriguing. It offers an outlet for the attor-
ney's views, including testimony of facts and opinions relevant to the
client's competence. The significance of Justice Kennedy's comment is
underscored by the context in which it was made. The Court decided
that placing the burden of proving incompetence to stand trial on the
defendant did not violate due process.' 5 Thus, counsel raising the com-
petency issue on behalf of her client has the burden of proving it.
Prior cases provide support for Medina's suggestion that the
defense attorney's role may differ when the issue is competence.
Included as dictum, in United States v. David, Chief Judge Bazelon
stated:
This court recognizes that in making a competency determination it
may be very useful for the trial judge to question both the defendant
and his counsel . . . . Thus, counsel's first-hand evaluation of a
defendant's ability to consult on his case and to understand the
charges and proceedings against him may be as valuable as an expert
psychiatric opinion on his competency.' 6
In United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker,'7 the Second Circuit held
that the opinions of three experienced defense attorneys that the defend-
placed the burden of proving incompetency on the moving party even if that party is the
defendant).
13. Id. at 450 (citing United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); see also
United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker, 455 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that defense counsel's
opinion of his client's capacity to understand and cooperate in the proceedings is significant and
probative).
14. Medina, 505 U.S. at 450.
15. Id. at 446-48. Medina consented to putting his competency in issue. However, since the
prosecution did not raise the issue of competence nor try to elicit testimony from defense counsel,
the Court did not address these issues. Also, significantly absent from the Court's analysis was
the situation wherein counsel and client disagree on the client's competence.
16. United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted)
("Judicial questioning of the accused and his trial counsel may be of special use in revealing
whether the defendant is able to assist in the defense of his case.") (citing Cooper v. United States,
337 F.2d 538, 539 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., concurring)). These cases do not address the
extent to which either the attorney's or the defendant's statements could be used after the
competency determination. See infra notes 280-96 and accompanying text.
17. 455 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ant was competent, offered in conjunction with the guilty plea, provided
a sufficient basis to obviate the need for a competency hearing. As
stated by the court, "[t]he opinion of a defendant's attorney as to his
ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to cooperate in
the preparation of his defense, is indeed significant and probative.
18
The dissent in Medina19 recognized potential obstacles to defense
counsel's participation in the competency hearing. The dissent suggested
that defense counsel would hesitate to participate due to concerns about
violating the attorney-client privilege or other ethical rules, such as bar-
ring counsel from becoming a witness adverse to her client.2" Judicial
skepticism of the attorney's testimony, presumably based on the duty of
loyalty to the client,2" was also cited as a reason counsel would not par-
ticipate or might be an ineffective witness.22
Notwithstanding these concerns, recognizing the importance of the
defense attorney in the competency determination has opened the door
to an untraditional role for counsel. This role is consistent with the
attorney's duty as an "officer of the court,"23 as well as to elementary
principles of agency, which forms the basis of the attorney-client rela-
tionship.24 However, the role suggested by the Court may be inconsis-
18. Id. at 1108. See also United States ex rel. Mireles v. Greer, 736 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that defense counsel's opinion as to the defendant's ability to understand
proceedings should be considered by the court); United States ex rel. Rivera v. Franzen, 692 F.2d
491, 500 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that defense counsel is in a better position than other
participants to evaluate his client's ability to comprehend the proceedings); MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE
PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 80-82 (1968); David E. Bennett, Comment, Competency
to Stand Trial: A Call for Reform, 59 J. Cium. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 569, 574-78
(1968).
19. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justice Stevens in the dissent.
20. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 465-66 (citing ABA CImIN AL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS § 7-4.8(b), commentary at 209, 212-13 (1989)).
21. See, e.g., McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 660 (Alaska 1977). McKinney held that
defense counsel's assessment of competency should be accorded great weight only if counsel
opined that the client was competent. If the attorney concluded that the client was incompetent,
although it may have been relevant, was not dispositive because "[a]n attorney's duty as an
advocate will often require him to present those arguments on behalf of his client ... ." Id.
22. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 466 (suggesting that defense counsel's testimony might be
discounted due to its "self-interested nature"). See also Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or
Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65, 72-73 (public defenders raising a competency
defense might be perceived as being motivated by selfish reasons because they lack experience
and resources, and have high case loads). Interestingly, the dissent in Medina focused on the
defense attorney's likely concerns, which may cause her to choose not to participate, rather than
focusing on whether the attorney-client privilege or the ethical rules would act to bar the
attorney's testimony. Medina, 505 U.S. at 465-66.
23. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8(b), commentary at
209, 212-13 (1989)). See also infra Part IV.B.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 26 & cmt. d;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 20; see also infra notes 145, 151 and accompanying text.
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tent with the lawyer's ethical duties of loyalty, zealousness, and
confidentiality, and may potentially violate the attorney-client privilege,
creating a serious conflict for defense counsel.25
B. The Role of Defense Counsel
Historically, the role of defense counsel in the competency process
has been limited. 6 Counsel is obligated to bring concerns about her
client's competency to the attention of the court whenever they occur.2 7
However, the substance of the notice has been proscribed by traditional
notions of the attorney-client privilege, ethical rules, and the conven-
tional conception of the role of the criminal defense attorney. 28
Although defense counsel may possess uniquely important infor-
mation about the defendant's competence, unavailable from any other
25. See infra Parts IlI.A and III.B.
26. Initially, courts must ascertain whether the attorney-client relationship exists. Neither the
attorney-client privilege nor the confidentiality provisions of the ethical rules precludes inquiry
into whether a genuine relationship exists. The trial judge has an independent obligation to
conduct a competency inquiry when sufficient doubt about the defendant's competence exists.
See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). The importance of accurately determining
competency of the defendant requires courts to conduct a full inquiry into the relationship between
the defendant and his attorney. See William T. Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal
Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 62 (1977).
27. See generally Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Youtsey v. United States,
97 F. 937, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1899); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL Hi-EAL. H STANDARDS § 7-4.2
and commentary at 180. But see Uphoff, supra note 22, at 74 (suggesting that in close cases, if
the attorney's goals are consistent with the client's, the attorney need not raise the issue of
incompetency); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY 37 (1996)
("(I]f a criminal defendant of doubtful competence expresses the choice to plead guilty or stand
trial and counsel agrees that this election would be in the defendant's best interests, the defendant
should be permitted to make the choice."). Id. at 43. ("When counsel disagrees . . . the
defendant's competency should become the subject of inquiry.") Id. at n. 137; Richard J. Bonnie,
The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539,
564-65 (1993). The attorney-client privilege cannot bar defense attorneys from notifying courts of
competency problems as long as client confidences are not revealed. See infra notes 265-69 and
accompanying text. And the ethical rules should not bar the notice for the reasons discussed infra
Part VI.B.
28. See infra Part IV.
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source,29 she has been largely ignored in the competency process.3  The
defense lawyer, unlike the mental health expert, judge, or prosecutor,
observes the client in the context of the particular facts and law of the
case and, thus, is in a position to know the extent to which the client can
rationally understand and cooperate. As a result, defense counsel is
aware of communication and cooperation problems which could inter-
fere with developing and presenting a defense.3' The defense attorney is
also familiar with the prosecution's evidence (in varying degrees
depending on the jurisdiction and stage of the proceedings),32 the law
relevant to the case, and venue-specific idiosyncrasies.
Judicial and prosecutorial contacts with the defendant are fleeting.
They are limited to court appearances which, other than trial or hear-
ings,33 are usually short and vary in frequency among the jurisdictions.
Court appearances also tend to be formal, and criminal defendants are
seldom asked to participate or testify even at trial or hearings. Other
than guilty pleas, during which defendants commonly provide monosyl-
labic answers (yes or no) and a brief statement of facts making out the
crime,34 the judge's and prosecutor's first-hand knowledge of the
defendant is limited to observations in the antiseptic environment of the
29. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, § 7-4.8 and accompanying
commentary at 211-12 (observing that the defendant's ability to consult with defense counsel is at
the heart of the competency standard and defense counsel may be the most important witness on
that issue. "A defense attorney not only is in close and continuing communication with a client,
but he or she also knows the extent to which presentation of substantive and factual defenses may
turn on the client's ability to understand them and assist counsel in advancing them."). See also
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992) ("[D]efense counsel will often have the best-
informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his defense."); United States v. David,
511 F.2d 355, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting the importance of defense counsel's evaluation of the
defendant's competence); Cooper v. United States, 337 F.2d 538, 539 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(suggesting same).
30. See Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23, 27 (1986). See also Pizzi, supra note 26, at
27. Professor Pizzi remarked:
For practical reasons, the key to the competency issue is the defense attorney. The
defense attorney has the most exposure to his client, and, unlike the court or
prosecutor, he witnesses his client's behavior on various occasions and in various
settings and circumstances. Given the test for incompetency, the importance of the
defense attorney is not surprising; he generally has the best opportunity to notice
any defects in the defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer.
Id. (footnote omitted).
31. See Paul A. Chernoff & William G. Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical
Quicksand, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 505, 517 (1972); Uphoff, supra note 22, at 95 ("It is defense
counsel who is best able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the defendant's case and the
need for and ability of the defendant to assist counsel."); Pizzi, supra note 26, at 27, 58-59.
32. See, e.g., FED. R. CraM. P. 16(a) (1997).
33. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 95 ("[I]t is the defense lawyer, not the trial judge, who is in
the best position to know the client's options and desires.").
34. See, e.g., FED. R. CraM. P. 11(c).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
courtroom.3 5
Although uniquely informed, there may be reason to question the
defense attorney's actual performance. Professor Michael Perlin has
described defense counsel's performance in representing the mentally
disabled as "grossly inadequate," 36 in part because defense counsel are
usually not "conversant with psychiatric and psychological principles. 37
Additionally, criminal defendants presenting incompetency issues are
frequently represented by assigned counsel who often suffer from inex-
perience, lack of resources, and heavy caseloads. 38 Notwithstanding the
veracity of these general criticisms, many defense attorneys, including
assigned counsel, have the experience, resources, and will to provide
competent representation.3 9 In any event, Professor Perlin's observa-
tions, as they relate to the attorney's ability-not integrity-should be
cause to improve the quality of the representation provided to the men-
tally ill charged with criminal offenses. They should not, however, pre-
vent counsel from disclosing client confidences that may support a
finding that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
III. COMPETENCE TO PROCEED
The phenomenon of incompetence, an inability to arrive at a rea-
soned decision,40 has been overwhelmingly accepted in the fields of psy-
chiatry, medicine, philosophy, and law.41 Incompetence may be caused
by a physical or mental disability. Normally, there is a clinically identi-
fiable source of the deficit or irrationality,4" but there need not be.43
This concept is, by nature, dynamic and fluid.' Issues of competence
35. See Pizzi, supra note 26, at 27; Uphoff, supra note 22, at 95.
36. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumptions: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in
Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43 (1992).
37. MICHAEL PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY § 4.07 (1994). See also Bonnie, supra
note 27, at 567 (observing that issues of defense counsel's performance "often masquerade as
issues of client competence" and urging improved quality of representation).
38. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 72-73.
39. Competence of defense counsel is a separate problem, outside the scope of this Article.
However, no evidence suggests that defense counsel would be unable to respond appropriately to
this proposal.
40. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (defendant must have
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding").
41. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 536. But see generally THOMAS S. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC
SLAVERY (1977); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
42. See S. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 697, 701 (3d ed. 1985).
43. Long before modem psychiatry, courts recognized incompetency as a condition
preventing proceedings against a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Youtsey v. United States, 97 F.
937 (6th Cir. 1899). Today, courts put great emphasis on the fields of psychiatry and psychology
in determining the competency of a defendant.
44. One can be competent for some matters but not for others. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at
[Vol. 52:529
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among those charged with criminal conduct are common,45 particularly
for attorneys employed by institutional defenders.46
A. The Legal Standard of Competency to Proceed
1. THE COMMON-LAW TEST
The common law test to determine competence focused on the
unjustness of proceeding against a mentally impaired criminal defendant
who might not be able to assist with his defense.47 The test explicitly
recognized the possibility that the defendant might "feign" mental defi-
ciency. 48 By emphasizing the need for the defendant to possess the
capacity to appreciate his situation and rationally assist counsel, the
common law test essentially mirrors the constitutionally based test
announced by the U.S. Supreme Court.49
2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST
The standard for determining competency in a criminal case was
announced in Dusky v. United States.50 There, the Court said:
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events," but
that the "test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to con-
sult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understand-
ing-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him."5 1
536. See also WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 37 ("It is more appropriate to understand that
there are degrees of competency falling along a continuum and that competency is almost always
in flux."). Professor Uphoff suggests that competency is a continuum. At one end is the client
who is a rational decision maker, able to articulate goals and make informed decisions, and at the
other end is the client seemingly unaware of anything said by defense counsel, unable to state any
goals, and incapable of making any choices. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 103-04.
45. See Hoge et al., supra note 10, at 392; Poythress et al., supra note 10, at 450.
46. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 72.
47. See Paa.N, supra note 37, at § 4.03.
48. Id. (citing United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)).
49. Id.
50. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). While the focus in Dusky and this Article is
determining competency to stand trial, competency determinations for post-conviction events also
present difficult issues. The standard for the latter issue requires that courts determine: "whether
[the petitioner] has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect
to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a
mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity." Mason ex rel.
Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 989, 991
(1966)).
51. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. Professor Winick has criticized this standard as permitting
clinical evaluators relied on by the courts, who typically are paternalistically
oriented, to classify marginally competent people with mental disabilities as
incompetent . . . . [M]any criminal defendants who wish to stand trial or plead
guilty, and whose interests would be furthered by permitting them to do so, instead
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In Drope v. Missouri, the Court went further by adding that the defend-
ant had to possess the ability "to assist in preparing his defense. '52
B. Competence to Proceed Is Required by Due Process
Convicting "an accused person while he is legally incompetent vio-
lates due process," because competency to proceed is an "aspect of sub-
stantive due process."53 The exercise of rights integral to a fair trial
depends on the defendant's ability to rationally participate in the crimi-
nal proceeding. 4
Our adversary system requires a criminal defendant to be compe-
tent for several reasons: (1) reliability (an incompetent defendant who is
incapable of rationally understanding the charges and the process, and of
rationally selecting and communicating information, may be wrongly
convicted because exculpatory or mitigating information would not be
provided to defense counsel);55 (2) individual autonomy (refusing to
proceed against defendants who are incapable of making rational deci-
sions, safeguards individual autonomy); 6 and (3) considerations of fair-
are found incompetent and subjected to an enforced delay in the exercise of their
right to speedy trial, and to the numerous disadvantages-sometimes including
unnecessary detention, hospitalization, and treatment-that follow an incompetency
adjudication.
WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 44-45 (footnotes omitted). However, actual findings of
incompetency by courts relying on these experts are quite rare. See Bruce J. Winick, Restructur-
ing Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 930-33 (1985).
52. 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
53. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). See also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348,
116 S. Ct. 1373, 1376-77 (1996) ("We have repeatedly and consistently recognized that 'the
criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process."') (citations omitted); Drope, 420
U.S. at 171-72 (holding that trying a criminal defendant who is not competent violates due process
and that counsel has a duty to raise the issue of competency); Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 ("[I]t is
contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently
'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial."). But see NORVAL
MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 79 (1982); Winick, supra note 51, at 968 (arguing
that the discussion of substantive due process in Pate is dicta). See also Incompetency to Stand
Trial, 81 HARv. L. REV. 454, 457-59 (1967).
54. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 457 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The right
to be tried while competent is the foundational right for the effective exercise of a defendant's
other rights in a criminal trial."); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those
rights deemed essential to a fair trial ....").
55. See Bonnie, supra note 27, at 552; Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 53; Linda
Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competence to Stand Trial in Light of the
Synthetically Sane Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1109, 1112-17 (1986) (arguing that
defendants have a right not to be made synthetically competent and can still be tried with
procedural safeguards).
56. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in
Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1661 (1995)
(Autonomy "presupposes a degree of competency .... [T]he process of choosing implies that the
decision maker is competent to weigh the alternatives and to assess their consequences in a
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ness (proceeding against someone whose wits are not about him is
unseemly,57 in part because the image of the state with its enormous
powers aligned against an impaired defendant offends our sense of fair
play). 8 Furthermore, the bar against prosecuting incompetent defend-
ants is grounded in the belief that such a proceeding would diminish
society's respect for the judicial process. 9
C. Determination of Competency
The issue of legal competence is normally resolved in an adversary
proceeding6' intended to produce the "truth" or at least reliable results;
however, the subject of competency has its critics.61 Competency issues
can arise at any time from arrest through appeal, collateral attack, and
service of sentence. The most common situation occurs soon after arrest
rational and informed manner."). Using the incompetency doctrine to protect autonomy is a two-
edged sword. Properly used, it can prevent significantly impaired defendants from making
disastrous choices; however, misuse can interfere with client choices that are simply different. See
generally David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 466-67
(discussing difficulty in defining irrationality in a pluralistic society).
57. Pizzi, supra note 26, at 31 ("[E]ven if counsel could guarantee a reliable trial, something
important in the criminal process is lost when a defendant is convicted in a proceeding he does not
understand and in which he cannot play even a minimal role.") (footnotes omitted); see also
Fentiman, supra note 55, at 1112-17.
58. Proceedings against incompetent defendants have long been prohibited. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376-77 (1996) (reaffirming this fundamental rule);
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975):
It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a
trial. Thus, Blackstone wrote that one who became "mad" after the commission of
an offense should not be arraigned for it "because he is not able to plead to it with
that advice and caution that he ought." Similarly, if he became 'mad' after
pleading, he should not be tried, "for how can he make his defense?" For our
purposes, it suffices to note that the prohibition is fundamental to an adversary
system of justice.
Id. at 171 (quoting WILLAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1769); accord MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 34-35 (1847). See also Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940-42 (6th Cir. 1899)
(reviewing a long line of English and American authorities forbidding proceedings against incom-
petent criminal defendants).
59. There is also the related concern that punishment would not be meaningful to the
incompetent defendant. Fentiman, supra note 55, at 1117; Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra
note 53, at 453-59.
60. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242 (1984).
61. Adversarial competency hearings have been criticized. See Bishop v. Superior Court, 724
P.2d 23, 29 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (suggesting that defense counsel and the prosecutor "cannot be
expected to fulfill their pragmatic adversarial roles" in competency proceedings); Pizzi, supra note
26, at 63-64 (same). See also Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(Bazelon, J., concurring) (suggesting that a post-conviction competency hearing should not be
adversarial where the defendant insisted he was competent but amicus curiae, appointed by the
court, questioned the defendant's competency).
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when the defense attorney alerts the court to an apparent competency
problem.6 2 The defendant is then interviewed by a mental health expert
who renders a report on the defendant's competence. If the expert con-
cludes that the defendant is competent, the issue is often resolved
because, absent objection, the court will usually confirm the expert's
report.63 The case then proceeds. On the other hand, if the expert finds
the defendant is incompetent, the defendant is usually interviewed by
additional experts and confined until found to be competent. 6"
The defendant's status as incompetent cannot continue indefinitely.
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court held that confinement cannot
last longer than reasonably necessary to determine if competency can be
restored in a reasonable period of time.65 If it is determined that this
cannot be accomplished, the defendant must be civilly committed or
released.66
Situations in which the lawyer and the client disagree about the
issue of competence are less common. The prosecution and the court
must also raise the question of competence if they have information
causing them to doubt the sufficiency of the defendant's mental
capacity.67
1. A FUNCTIONAL TEST
The legal competency standard embodies two distinct but related
concepts: a determination of the defendant's ability to rationally under-
stand and appreciate the legal proceedings with which he is confronted;
and a determination of whether the defendant can think rationally in
order to assist defense counsel.68 To make these assessments, courts
must examine the defendant's ability to rationally understand, appreci-
ate, and communicate about (1) the charges, including the range and
62. As noted, at common law and to this day, the defense attorney has generally been
obligated to notify the court whenever a competency problem presents itself. See supra note 27;
but see Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 31, at 520-21 (stating that defense counsel is not
obligated to raise competency when "he believes he can win the case without the active
participation of his client."); Uphoff, supra note 22, at 91-92 (attorneys should not be required to
raise the issue of competency when it would be against the client's interest or desire); WEXLER &
WINCK, supra note 27.
63. See BRAKEL L'r AL., supra note 42, at 703. (recommendations by mental health
professionals exert tremendous influence on judicial determinations, with rates of agreement
typically exceeding 90%).
64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1984).
65. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
66. See id.
67. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (where evidence raises "a bona fide
doubt" as to competence, the judge must conduct a hearing sui sponte). Cf Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934) (a prosecutor's interest must be to serve justice, not just win).
68. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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nature of possible penalties and likely outcomes; (2) the roles of the
judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, jury, and witnesses; and (3) the fac-
tual bases of the charges and possible defenses, including plea options,
and the ability to make rational choices among them. Courts must also
assess the defendant's ability to rationally assist his counsel in evaluat-
ing the testimony of witnesses and the significance of exhibits, whether
the defendant can testify coherently, and whether the defendant can con-
trol motor and verbal behavior to avoid disrupting court proceedings.69
The various facts underlying each of these categories will differ from
case to case, and no single factor will necessarily be dispositive.
As these factors reflect, legal competency is not merely a measure
of the function of the defendant's cognitive faculties, such as those that
can be quantified or classified by psychological testing.7" One can be
intelligent and articulate, capable of goal oriented behavior which is
internally consistent, yet still have underlying psychiatric and emotional
problems which cause incompetence.71 Simply having the capacity for
rational understanding in the abstract is not sufficient if psychiatric or
emotional problems prevent applying rational faculties to the problem.72
2. RELIANCE ON MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
Administering this legal standard presents difficult issues. Of par-
ticular concern is the source and type of information on which courts
may rely in making competency determinations and the importance of
rationality to competence. These issues arise for two reasons. First,
mental health professionals, heavily relied upon by courts, inevitably
possess a therapeutic focus, 73 which is sometimes contrary to the legal
standard.74 Second, a legal focus does not currently factor into the com-
petency determination. Notwithstanding the fact that courts routinely
69. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402; Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1991);
Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321 (W.D. Mo. 1961); Uphoff, supra note 22, at 99-100; see
also United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (distinguishing "rational"
understanding from "factual" understanding).
70. See, e.g., Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402; Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1554; Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495.
71. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. at 504-05. See Kathleen Cranley Glass, Refining Definitions and
Devising Instruments: Two Decades of Assessing Mental Competence, 20 INT'L. J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 5 (1997) (discussing "emotional" competence as it affects cognitive functioning and
understanding). See also infra notes 154-63 and accompanying text for discussion of rationality
and competence.
72. See Glass, supra note 71. See also infra notes 138-66 and accompanying text.
73. See Fentiman, supra note 55, at 1118-19; ABA CaimuNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS § 7-4.1 and accompanying commentary at 173-75.
74. See id. See also Douglas Mossman & Kathleen J. Hart, Presenting Evidence of
Malingering to Courts: Insights from Decision Theory, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 271, 271 (1996)
("Mental health professionals perennially feel uncomfortable and awkward about presenting
psychiatric and psychological evidence to courts .... ").
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obtain the assistance of psychological or psychiatric experts, 75 compe-
tency is a legal concept, requiring judicial determination. 76  Despite its
legal character, however, competency determinations have been virtu-
ally delegated to mental health professionals," whose opinions are given
little scrutiny by the courts. 78  Often, courts are given little or no addi-
tional information for judging the competency of a defendant.
Mental health professionals possess the expertise to administer and
interpret various psychological tests, and to conduct psychiatric inter-
views, to determine whether mental pathology exists.79 As experts, they
can also opine that their examination revealed clinical deficiencies,
which may suggest that a defendant's professed lack of understanding or
cooperation is willful.80 Consequently, while their opinions may not
always be harmonious," these experts can reach a particular diagnosis
and make predictions about its effect on the attorney-client relationship.
But these mental health experts have no special education, training, or
75. See generally A. Louis McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial
and Mental Illness: Review and Preview, 49 B.U. L. REv. 46 (1969) (discussing the difficulties
mental health experts experience in assessing legal competency); Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note
31, at 509-10 (discussing the role of mental health professionals in adversarial proceedings).
76. See, e.g., United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 360 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (judge
determines competency and does not have to accept psychiatric opinion as determinative); Cooper
v. United States, 337 F.2d 538, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., concurring) (holding that trial
court must make determination of competence to stand trial instead of accepting psychiatric
opinion as dispositive); Coffman v. United States, 290 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1961); Formhals v.
United States, 278 F.2d 43, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1960); Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th
Cir. 1959); United States v. Zovluck, 425 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Miller v. United States,
207 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Fla. 1962).
77. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 455-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Competency
determination is based largely on the testimony of psychiatrists"). See also Robert A. Nicholson
& William G. Johnson, Prediction of Competency to Stand Trial: Contribution of Demographics,
Type of Offense, Clinical Characteristics, and Psycholegal Ability, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
287 (1991); BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 42, at 700.
78. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 42, at 703.
79. For diagnostic criteria of mental pathology, see generally DIAGNosTIc AND STArISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORrERS (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV].
80. "Willfulness" in this context is known as malingering. Malingering is defined as "the
intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms,
motivated by external incentives such as ... evading criminal prosecution .. " DSM IV, supra
note 79, at 683.
81. Mental health experts often reach different conclusions even though the facts are the
same. See, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956) (several court appointed
psychiatrists disagreed on defendant's competence). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
180 (1975) ("trained psychiatrists can entertain [varying opinions] on the same facts"); M.N.
Howard, The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice, 1991 CRnm. L. REv. 98, 101
(observing that experts considered venal when employed by a party are mysteriously "transformed
into paragons of objectivity when employed by the courts."); Mossman & Hart, supra note 74, at
271; Roberta W. Shell, Psychiatric Testimony: Science or Fortune-Telling?, BARRusTER, Fall
1980, at 55 (quoting a criminal defense attorney as stating: "In virtually any case, I can find'a
psychiatric witness to make whatever recommendations I want.").
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skill to determine whether a defendant's choice is rational.8 2 Moreover,
in most cases, the expert will only have one or two brief visits with the
defendant.8 3 Compounding this problem is the mental health expert's
lack of information about the prosecution and the defense to be
presented.84
In applying the legal standard, however, courts must distinguish
between truly incompetent defendants and those with whose decisions
the defense attorney merely disagrees. To be effective, the danger of
circular reasoning must be resisted. Professor David Luban put it well
when he said:
The trick is to come up with a notion of incompetence that is not self-
justifying and self-serving. Thus, it would clearly be wrong to say
something like, "You don't really want that. You just think you do
because your decisionmaking mechanisms are impaired. How, do I
know? If they weren't impaired you wouldn't want that.",85
Operation of the legal standard must also recognize that the concept of
incompetency is not susceptible to mathematical or even scientific anal-
ysis; indeed, it reflects moral, political, and cultural judgments of the
evaluator and the evaluated.86
3. ILLUSTRATIONS
The complex nature of the issues involved in a competency deter-
mination and the need for defense counsel participation are illustrated in
the following three cases.
a. United States v. Blohm
William Blohm, acting pro se, filed a copyright infringement suit
82. This is not to say that mental health professionals are unable to opine as to whether a
particular defendant is rational. Their training and experience, however, make them no better than
a lawyer at reaching such a conclusion.
83. Competency is often determined on the basis of a single interview lasting less than an
hour. See, e.g., United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (thirty minute
interview); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 1971) (ten minute interview).
84. This will vary from case to case, expert to expert, and the party for which the expert is
retained.
85. Luban, supra note 56, at 466 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 480-81 (discussing
findings of incompetency in testament cases, based on the abnormal nature of the dispositions).
86. Id. at 488-90 & n.86. See also WEXLER & WInICK, supra note 27, at 46 ("A competency
evaluation, however, inevitably involves subjective cultural, social, political, and legal judgments
that are essentially normative in nature."); Bonnie, supra note 27, at 601 ("Whether a defendant
fails to 'appreciate' the nature and consequences of the decision or lacks the capacity to make a
'reasoned choice' is, of course, not a clinical 'fact,' but rather a thick value judgment anchored in
intuitions about individual autonomy and social obligation."). But see DSM IV, supra note 79, at
xxiv (addressing different cultural and ethnic settings and suggesting its international acceptance
demonstrates its usefulness in describing mental disorders around the world).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
against Trans World International ("TWI").8 7 Blohm claimed that a
movie being produced by TWI was based on his handwritten document
entitled "Screen Notes." "Screen Notes" is a story about a young man
(Blohm) who appears normal and unremarkable, but who actually pos-
sesses superhuman strength. 8 Supposedly, the document was autobio-
graphical and was sent to TWI unsolicited.8 9
As the civil case unfolded, Blohm submitted letters and other
materials to the court. These materials included a "complaint" that
charged the judge with conspiracy to suppress evidence, and alleged that
the judge, Richard Nixon, and Arnold Palmer were co-conspirators
because "they all play golf."90 Additionally, Blohm moved to have the
case reassigned based on the trial judge's "possible association" with
TWI because of Palmer's position on the board of directors of a corpo-
rate relative of TWI.91 Further, after TWI was granted summary judg-
ment, Blohm sent a letter threatening the trial judge and the judges of the
Second Circuit.92 After sending an empty shotgun shell box, earplugs,
and a letter to the trial judge stating that if he did not get relief from the
Second Circuit, "he would bring a sawed off shotgun to the courthouse
for the purpose of assassinating, '93 Blohm was arrested. He was
charged with threatening the life of a federal judge, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 876.94
Blohm was assigned counsel and subsequently offered a deferred
prosecution 95 on the condition that he engage in outpatient psychologi-
cal counseling and that all communications with the court be through
counsel. Defense counsel urged Blohm to accept the offer, but he
rejected it. Blohm wanted to expose the golf conspiracy at trial. During
the pendency of the criminal proceeding, Blohm persisted in sending
letters to the trial judge and the prosecutor, as well as filing complaints
against a number of other judges.96
87. See Blohm v. Trans World Int'l, 82 Civ. 1684 (Complaint filed March 18, 1982) (on file
with author). The author initially represented Blohm in United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
88. See Blohm, 82 Civ. 1684, Complaint at 3.
89. See id.
90. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. at 497. Blohm thought that Richard Nixon, the judge (who was
appointed by Richard Nixon), and Arnold Palmer, who was part owner of a company that owned
the building in which TWI maintained its offices, all knew each other and played golf together.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. A deferred prosecution conditionally suspends the prosecution for a period of time. If the
conditions are complied with, the charges are dismissed. See UNITED STATES ATrORNEY'S
MANUAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
96. See Blohm, 579 F. Supp. at 501.
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Two experienced forensic psychiatrists (one selected by the prose-
cutor and one by the defense attorney) examined Blohm to determine if
he was competent to proceed. Both experts found that, although he suf-
fered from a paranoid delusion, he was competent, because he under-
stood the charges, the role of the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney,
and jury, his rights, and the possibility that a conviction could result in a
jail sentence. 97 Nonetheless, the court ordered a competency hearing at
which both psychiatrists testified that Blohm was competent but men-
tally ill. 98 Blohm also testified.
After the prosecution's direct examination of the first psychiatrist,
defense counsel was relieved and assigned as an amicus curiae to the
court.99 Blohm was assigned new counsel. Subsequently, at the contin-
ued hearing the amicus cross-examined one of the experts, as well as his
former client, but was instructed not to reveal client confidences.
1°°
In finding Blohm incompetent to stand trial, the court agreed with
the examining psychiatrists that he had a factual understanding of the
proceedings, the applicable statutes, and the procedures,"° ' but found
that the critical issue was rationality:
It is the determination of rationality about which the dispute centers.
I conclude that the rationality to be demonstrated is that of an objec-
tive rationality, what would be regarded as rational to the average
person, not to the defendant, not to the psychiatrists, who in this
instance considered Blohm competent because his perspective and his
acts were consistent with his felt need, his delusion .... [T]he techni-
cal standards which the psychiatrists considered were entirely appro-
priate for their professional purpose but failed to include the sense of
97. See id. at 502. One of the experts who found Blohm competent, defined delusion as "a
false, 'unshakable idea' and described Blohm's conspiracy beliefs as "psychotic and irrational."
See id. at 503. See also DSM IV, supra note 79, §§ 295.30-298.9, at 287-315.
98. See Blohm, 579 F. Supp at 503. Although one of the doctors said Blohm was rational,
when asked for another word descriptive of him, she replied: "Crazy .... It looks crazy to the
rest of the world." Id. at 499.
99. The district court relied on Seidner v. United States, where the defendant was incarcerated
as a "certified psychotic." Id. at 498 & n.1 (citing Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 734
(D.C. Cir. 1958)). In Seidner, counsel appointed as amicus curiae to present the defendant's case
argued that the defendant's sentence should be vacated because he was incompetent at the time he
pleaded guilty. However, when the defendant rejected this position, the amicus' motion to vacate
was denied. See Seidner, 260 F.2d at 732. On appeal, the court said:
If appellant is indeed mentally incompetent, as the amicus memorandum suggests,
we cannot rely upon his election as to whether that issue is to be raised in his
defense. The court below may, at its discretion, appoint counsel to represent
appellant's interests, or if he persists in refusing counsel the court may appoint an
amicus curiae to present the case independently.
Id. at 734. See also State v. Aumann, 265 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1978).
100. See Blohm, 579 F. Supp. at 498.
101. See id. at 499.
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rationality as it is commonly understood .... "Rational," as used in
the cases, must not be devoid of common understanding, and it is the
court to which the society has assigned the decisional task, not the
medical profession.1 12
The court determined that Blohm's decision to go to trial was irrational,
the product of mental illness. 10 3
b. Dusky v. United States
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Dusky v. United States,"° the lower court's factual discussion con-
cerning the competency issue demonstrates the confusion which contin-
ues to exist.' 5 The Eighth Circuit's opinion includes significant
portions of the psychiatrists' reports that indicated, among other
problems, Dusky suffered from "poor reality contact" and "auditory and
visual hallucinations."' 6 One psychological test revealed that Dusky's
personality had "decompensated to a psychotic degree of severity and
thus impl[ied] the personality [sic] loss of capacity to master conflict
situations and to meet reality demands." ' 7 He experienced hallucina-
tions, delusions, and ideas of reference, and was diagnosed as schizo-
phrenic.' 0 The hospital staff opined that although Dusky was "oriented
as to time, place, and person," and possessed average intelligence,
including a normal capacity for abstract thinking, he was unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings, the charges against him, and
was unable to properly assist defense counsel.' 9
At the competency hearing, the hospital's doctor explained that
Dusky knew the days of the week, the time, where he was, his circum-
stances, and the roles of his lawyer, the judge, and the jury."l0 Dusky
apparently also understood that he would be punished if found guilty."'
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. See id. at 506.
104. 362 U.S. 402 (1980), rev'g 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959).
105. The district court found that Dusky had sufficient mental competence to stand trial.
Objections by the defense attorney suggested that he possessed information that, if disclosed,
could have persuaded the court otherwise. See Dusky, 271 F.2d at 390. Defense counsel
announced his agreement with the government's psychiatrist but decided it would have been
improper to "take the witness stand and be sworn and offer evidence in that regard. I make this
statement as a lawyer to the Court and I believe that the man is not properly able to assist his
counsel in his defense and should not be tried at this time." Id.
106. Id. at 387.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 387-89. Ideas of reference occur when "the person believes that certain
gestures, comments, passages from books, newspapers, song lyrics, or other environmental cues
are specifically directed at him or her." DSM IV, supra note 79, at 275.
109. See Dusky, 271 F.2d at 389.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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Dusky had been able to furnish accurate background information and
some facts about the events alleged in the indictment."1 2 The doctor,
however, believed Dusky would have been unable to properly assist his
attorney in his defense because he could not "properly interpret the
meaning of the things that have happened... [or] convey full knowl-
edge of his actual circumstances... due to an inability to interpret real-
ity from unreality... which is part of his mental illness."' 1 3 The doctor
also testified that Dusky's account of the relevant events would inevita-
bly be filtered through his mental illness, which could result in the attor-
ney receiving "false factual statement[s]." 114 The trial court's finding of
competency was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.
c. Lafferty v. Cook
The defendant in Lafferty115 purportedly received religious revela-
tions. One such revelation instructed him to "remove" his sister-in-law
and her child,' 1 6 which resulted in their deaths and Lafferty's arrest for
murder. Initially, Lafferty refused the assistance of counsel. Believing
all attorneys to be corrupt, he suspected that he was the object of a judi-
cial conspiracy that included his attorney. 17 Furthermore, he claimed
that because God directed his actions, the court lacked jurisdiction since
courts cannot intercede in religious or spiritual issues.18
Prior to trial, four competency hearings were conducted. At the
first hearing, two mental health experts concluded that Lafferty was
incompetent, and one diagnosed his condition as a "paranoid delusional
state." 1 9 Nonetheless, the court found Lafferty competent.'120 At the
second hearing, four doctors employed by the state hospital reported that
Lafferty was competent. The court agreed. 2' But, after Lafferty suf-
fered organic brain damage as a result of a suicide attempt, a third com-
petency hearing was held. The court concluded that Lafferty was
incompetent to proceed.' 22 Subsequently, the four doctors who had
declared Lafferty competent at the second hearing, revised their opinions
at the fourth hearing. Ultimately, the doctors concluded that he was
incompetent because "while [Lafferty] physically knew the nature of the
112. See id.
113. Id. (second alteration in original).
114. Id.
115. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
116. See id. at 1548.
117. See id. at 1553.
118. See id. at 1551-52 & n.5.
119. Id. at 1552.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
proceedings against him, and their possible consequences, he was unable
as a result of his paranoid delusional system to interpret them in a realis-
tic way." '123 Lafferty's plunge into irrationality was attributed to oxygen
deprivation during his attempted suicide. As a result, his already preca-
rious mental condition deteriorated into a "religious delusional system
containing strong elements of paranoia and an inability to 'determine the
boundaries between himself and good and evil spirits." 1 24
In contrast, the prosecution's expert, an attorney and a forensic psy-
chologist, testified that Lafferty was competent, although he conceded
that he had not personally examined Lafferty. 125  The prosecution's
expert posited that Lafferty understood the charges, was aware of the
nature of the proceedings, and thus was competent. 126 The court agreed,
finding that the only evidence of irrationality was the suicide attempt,
and that Lafferty's "refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or admit that he
is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are all consistent with his
paranoia and any delusional system pertaining to religion."' 27 Lafferty
was then tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.1 2
Because Lafferty was found competent, he was permitted to control
his representation at trial and waive an insanity defense over his attor-
ney's objection. ' 29 He also prohibited the introduction of expert medical
evidence which might have reduced the charges from murder to
manslaughter. 130
The Tenth Circuit granted habeas relief finding that the state trial
court misunderstood the concept of competency. 13 1 It concluded that a
defendant who acted consistently and logically within a delusional sys-
tem, but who was unable to accurately comprehend reality, was not
competent within the meaning of Dusky. 132 The court observed that the
physical demeanor of a defendant suffering from paranoid delusions
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1564 (footnote omitted). In a letter to the court, these doctors indicated that oxygen
deprivation to the brain had exacerbated his religious delusions which thus interfered "with his
ability to meaningfully function, either independently . . . or with the aid of counsel in a
courtroom." Id. (alteration in original).
125. See id. at 1552. The prosecution's expert had merely reviewed the reports of the other
examining doctors.
126. See id. at 1553-55.
127. Id. at 1554 (quoting Memorandum Decision of the state trial court). Notably, the trial
court found that Lafferty did not possess the ability to "engage in a rational decision making
process regarding... treatment," but criticized the conclusions of the doctors who had found him
to be incompetent because they were based on the Supreme Court's decision in Dusky. See id.
128. See id. at 1549.
129. See id. at 1555.
130. See id. at 1549.
131. See id. at 1548.
132. See id. at 1554-55.
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rarely provides relevant information about the effect of the delusional
system on his judgment.133 In addition, the court specifically addressed
the risk that a competency determination could become a vehicle for
imposing society's beliefs about right and wrong on individuals. "The
issue is not whether particular beliefs are 'wrong,' but whether those
beliefs are the product of a deluded view of reality that significantly
prevents a defendant from consulting with his lawyer." 134
The dissent 35 was troubled by the elusive nature of the rationality
concept. It feared the risk that a defendant's "unorthodox political
beliefs" might trigger competency proceedings, and that lawyers would
assume too much power.136  "When one is judged incompetent for
rejecting his attorney's advice we will then have truly established the
elitism of the bench and bar." '137
4. THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT OF THE COMPETENCE STANDARD
The capacity to act rationally is not synonymous with a defendant's
comprehension of the charges against him, the roles of the participants,
and the judicial process. 13  Rather, the key to legal competence in a
criminal case is the capacity of rational thought.139 Any doubt or confu-
133. See id. at 1555.
134. Id. at 1556 n.ll.
135. The dissenting opinion relied on the state trial court's findings of competence, and the
deference owed to state courts in habeas matters. See id. at 1561 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1566 & n.15.
137. Id. at 1566 n.15.
138. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996). Cooper construed
an Oklahoma statute that placed the burden on the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and
convincing evidence, see id. at 1374-75, and required that the defendant be able to "effectively
and rationally assist in his defense." Id. at 1377 n.5 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.1(1)
(West Supp. 1996)). Defendant, afraid the lead defense attorney was going to kill him, fell off the
witness stand trying to get away from him, refused to wear street clothes because they were
"burning" him, see id. at 1375 n.1, and sat apart from counsel "crouching in the fetal position and
talking to himself." Id. at 1376 n.2. Nevertheless, the trial court found the defendant competent.
See also, e.g., Lafferty, 949 F.2d 1546; Lagway v. Dallman, 806 F. Supp. 1322, 1336, 1344 (N.D.
Ohio 1992) (reversing, on substantive due process grounds, a state court determination of
competency where the defendant believed that the judge and the attorneys were agents of Satan);
United States v. Holmes, 671 F. Supp. 120, 121-22 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding the defendant, a
lawyer, competent to stand trial for mailing threatening letters to the son of former President Bush
because he believed the son and members of the U.S. Secret Service, among others, were involved
in a conspiracy to test experimental drugs on the defendant).
139. The Dusky Court stated:
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is] oriented to
time and place and [has] some recollection of events," but that the "test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (alterations in original and empha-
sis added) (no citation in original).
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sion about the importance of rationality to the competence standard
should be resolved by comparing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Dusky
with the Supreme Court's per curiam reversal of it. The Eighth Circuit
clearly relied on Dusky's understanding of the charges, the roles played
by the participants in the process, and his general orientation as to time
and place. 140 In reversing the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
explained that basic cognitive comprehension, while necessary, was
insufficient. 141
Distinguishing between rationality and irrationality, and mental ill-
ness and "normalcy," involves moral, philosophical, and factual judg-
ments, about which there is no universal agreement. Inevitably,
evaluating whether a defendant can rationally assist his counsel creates
tension between individual autonomy and paternalism.142 Frequently,
clients make choices that their lawyers think are risky, foolish, silly, odd
or harmful. But difference is not the equivalent of irrationality. The
challenge is to identify a standard that minimizes the risk of confusion.
In Paternalism and the Legal Profession, Professor David Luban
attempts to answer the question of when a lawyer can "justifiably exer-
cise paternalism over a client." '43 In so doing, he makes several impor-
tant observations. First, he equates autonomy with rationality, and
concludes that an individual with impaired decisionmaking capacity is
not autonomous. 1" But, for individuals who express acceptable "rea-
sons for non-self-interested preferences," paternalism is unjustified.145
Professor Luban next attempts to distinguish "unacceptable from
acceptable bad reasons for a preference." 14 6 He advances a test set forth
in Matter of Will of White:
140. See Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959).
141. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
142. See Federle, supra note 56, at 1669 ("[A]n incompetent client cannot be said to be
autonomous because she lacks the capacity to engage in rational decision making.").
143. Luban, supra note 56, at 460. Professor Luban defines "paternalism" as lawyer
manipulation of the case or the client in order to achieve what the lawyer thinks is for the client's
own good "even though the client does not see it that way." Id. at 458. Paternalism has also been
described as "an assault on the individual's integrity." Id. at 474.
Professor Luban begins by discussing seven examples drawn from actual cases. All of the
cases illustrate client choices, with which some might disagree, and propose possible ways for the
lawyer to manipulate the client to arrive at a result more comforting to the lawyer. See id. at 455-
46. Although none of Luban's examples suggests that mental illness interferes with the clients'
choices, his discussion is significant. He shows that client choices are affected by social and
psychological factors and values. See id. Thus, the test for competence, at least where mental
illness is not suggested, must be respectful of individual autonomy to avoid paternalistic
interference. See id. See also Tremblay, supra note 4, at 526 (a "client's knowledge of his own
interests and values requires that the final choices be his.").
144. See Luban, supra note 56, at 465.
145. Id. at 474.
146. Id. at 478.
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[I]f there are facts, however insufficient they may in reality be, from
which a prejudiced or a narrow or bigoted mind might derive a partic-
ular idea or belief, it cannot be said that the mind is diseased in that
respect. 147
Thus, an individual is competent "if any process is going on in the per-
son's head that can be called 'inference from real facts,"' 148 regardless
of whether the inference is valid, objective, or correct; in such instances,
paternalism is not justified.149 Professor Luban concedes that the White
test is "permissive" and will "countenance some strange folk as capably
rational." 150
Professor Luban's proposed test may be suitable for our highly plu-
ralistic society, but can it be applied to criminal defendants who may be
mentally ill? Assuming we can avoid circular reasoning, the question
must be answered in the negative. In this context, the test suffers from
two principal defects. 5' First, "real facts" is a concept about which
there may well be serious disagreement. Even if there was agreement on
its meaning, there seems to be no limit on the permissible inferences that
can be drawn by the individual. Second, although the ability to draw
inferences reveals something about the individual's ability to think, it
does not mean that the person is rational. For example, Blohm identified
several real facts, but the inferences he drew from them were absurd.' 2
In the end, Professor Luban's test grants autonomy to individuals who
are simply different. Unfortunately, the test also bestows competence on
those whose "inferences from real facts" are delusional.' 53
Rationality, pursuant to the competence standard set forth in Dusky,
embraces much more than the capacity to identify "real facts" and draw
inferences therefrom. There must be an additional tool that permits
appropriate distinctions between difference and irrationality. Although
imperfect, illness is such a tool. Illness is at least a crude way to distin-
guish client choices that the lawyer thinks unwise from choices that are
irrational. '54 Neither the facts nor the inferences can be the product of
illness. As long as the client's decisions are not the product of illness,
147. At 479 (quoting Matter of Will v. White, 24 N.E. 935, 937 (N.Y. 1890)).
148. Luban, supra note 56, at 479. Professor Luban proposed two alternative "non-circular"
tests of incompetency: "a definitive causal account of how the individual became incompetent, or
an inability on the individual's part to [explain] motives which [pass] the White test." Id. at 482.
149. See id. at 479.
150. Id. at 482.
151. Professor Luban did not explicitly address paternalism in the context of clients charged
with criminal conduct who were possibly incompetent as a result of mental illness.
152. United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
153. See Luban, supra note 56, at 479.
154. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 537-38. See also Federle, supra note 56, at 1669
("Respect for the client's autonomy implies that eccentric or peculiar decisions do not necessarily
denote incapacity.").
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interference is inappropriate. If these choices, however, are the result of
impairment, the client may be incompetent.'55 The risk of paternalism
can be minimized by giving less weight to the actual choices made by
the defendant, while relying more on the process used in making the
choices and by examining the explanations offered for the decision.' 56
In some cases, however, the defendant's choice itself may be com-
pelling evidence of irrationality. 57 Is the client who rejects a misde-
meanor offer when charged with a serious felony (from which there is
virtually no chance of acquittal) that mandates a five-year prison sen-
tence, and who is not claiming factual innocence, competent?1 58 Under-
lying this question are assumptions about the goals of all criminal
defendants as well as the purposes of the criminal justice system.
Assuming the goal of every defendant is acquittal or a lenient sentence,
any choice that does not maximize prison avoidance seems irrational.
But, not every client tells the lawyer to "get me off" or "get me as little
time as possible." Clients know far more than even a skillful inter-
viewer can elicit." 9 Criminal defendants may be motivated by desires
to tell their story, to protect someone, or to remain free, even when these
desires may not be in their best interests. Their goals, like those of many
clients, may not be entirely consistent, but that does not make them irra-
tional. Some clients elect to go to trial with the understanding that the
chances for acquittal are slim, because the risk of conviction after a trial
is preferable to the certainty of the specific jail sentence provoked by a
guilty plea.
Rationality, therefore, is not solely about whether a defendant's
choices are consistent with his best interests as judged by the lawyer.
Foolish or wise, the choice belongs to the unimpaired client.160 At a
minimum, when the client's choice would seem irrational to the "aver-
age person," the attorney must be confident that it is not substantially
influenced by, or is the product of, illness.1 6 1 If it is not influenced by or
155. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 537-38.
156. See Luban, supra note 56, at 474.("It is important, though, that the individual have
reasons for non-self-interested preferences. Otherwise, we may be forced to conclude that these
preferences are irrational wants, the product of impaired capacities.").
157. See id. at 480-82.
158. Professor Uphoff, a strong advocate of the impaired client's choice, supports the view that
interference in this instance is warranted. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 106.
159. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 100-02 (1979).
160. See, e.g., Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (citing Sweezy v.
Garrison, 554 F. Supp. 481, 492 (W.D.N.C. 1982)).
161. Dusky does not require "illness" as an element of incompetency. See Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). As a practical matter, however, it will be the rare case in which a
client's bizarre choice will not be thought by some mental health professionals to be the product
of illness.
[Vol. 52:529
1998] ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS & CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 555
the product of illness, there should be no interference with the client's
choice.162 Illness then becomes a tool to reduce the chance that determi-
nations of rationality will be defined by politics or popularity. 163 For
example, Blohm threatened a federal judge and refused a deferred prose-
cution because he believed he would be acquitted when he exposed the
golf conspiracy. 164 Harris, on the other hand, apparently committed the
bank robbery and wanted to plead guilty. Harris' decision, however,
was influenced by a delusional belief that his sentence would be affected
by his status as a witness to the conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.
Blohm was found to be incompetent to stand trial because he communi-
cated his delusions to the world.'65 In contrast, Harris was found to be
competent because he only communicated with his attorney. Harris,
however, may have been no more competent than Blohm.166
IV. THE ATTrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. The Attorney's Responsibility to the Client
The rules governing the attorney-client relationship are, in many
respects, based on the law of agency. 167 The lawyer, as a fiduciary, can
only act with the explicit or implicit authority of the client. 168 "In our
legal system, an attorney is [the] client's agent and representative; the
162. Cf. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blohm, 579 F.
Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Tremblay, supra note 4, at 537-38.
163. To some extent, of course, this merely moves the discussion to the definition of illness.
164. See Blohm, 579 F. Supp. at 503.
165. See id. at 504.
166. One may question whether the criminal justice system should be used as a forum for
delusional defendants to exorcise their delusions. Blohm was intent on going to trial to prove that
the judge, among others in the civil case, were part of a conspiracy and, thus, should be
impeached. See id. at 505. Although therapeutic, permitting defendants to play out their
delusions in court abuses the justice system.
167. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28 & cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996). Although the attorney-client relationship is closely related to
agency law, the attorney has obligations to the court as well as to society. Lawyers' roles also
differ from those of other agents by virtue of the independence they are permitted to exercise. See
id. See also generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).
168. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 38, 39 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). Professor Tremblay stated that:
Fundamentally, a lawyer's authority to act on behalf of a client stems from her
status as the client's agent.... This principle not only permits courts to hold parties
liable for the negligence of their chosen counsel.... but its accompanying effect is
to deny a lawyer the power to act except under delegated authority, either explicit or
implicit, from her principal.
Tremblay, supra note 4, at 518 n.12 (citation omitted). See also Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once?
To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, a Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man,
and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1611, 1617 (1996) (a lawyer's
obligation of confidentiality is rooted in fiduciary duties that an agent owes to a principal).
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client retains ultimate authority over the conduct of litigation." '69 This
principle is designed to ensure that each party makes his own choices
and bears the consequences of those choices. 70  This increases the
moral authority and acceptability of the resultant decisions.'71
As agent, the lawyer functions to assist her client in making
informed decisions. It is not the lawyer's function to impose her view of
what is in the client's best interest. 172 The agency relationship requires a
principal who is competent; 173 the attorney, therefore, is not authorized
to act when she has a reasonable belief that the principal is
incompetent. 171
The ethical rules reflect the agency principles which underlie the
attorney-client relationship. The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require lawyers to follow a client's instructions regarding the
goals of the representation, and further require that the client be kept
informed and be consulted about the methods to be used to obtain the
goals.' Similarly, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity places all decision-making in the hands of the client except for those
"decisions not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudic-
169. Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1996); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-7 (1983).
170. See Spiegel, supra note 159, at 75.
171. See id.
172. See generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED
APPROACH (1991) (advocating a model of "client-centered" representation emphasizing lawyer
neutrality and avoiding any form of persuasion).
173. See Kuder v. United Nat'l Bank, 497 A.2d 1105, 1108 (D.C. 1985) (stating the general
rule that when the principal loses requisite mental capacity the agency relationship terminates).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 cmt. (principal's incapacity terminates
relationship). But see id. § 122, at Caveat ("The Institute expresses no opinion as to the effect of
the principal's temporary incapacity due to a mental disease."). It is less clear how this general
rule applies to: (1) agents for principals who are temporarily incapacitated and/or have not been
adjudicated incompetent; and (2) agents or third parties without notice of the principal's
incapacity. See generally W. Alfred Mukatis, Does the Agency Die When the Principal Becomes
Mentally Incapacitated?, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 105 (1983). It does seem clear that notice of
the principal's incapacity deprives agents of authority and the right of third parties to rely on the
agent's authority. See id. at 113-16.
174. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35(2) (Proposed
Final Draft No.1, 1996) (When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions is
impaired, the lawyer may pursue a reasonable view of client's objectives "even if the client
expresses no wishes or gives contrary instructions.") See also id. § 43(3) cmt. e (stating that
application of the general agency rule, that incompetence of a principal terminates an agent's
authority, may be inappropriate to bar the attorney's efforts to protect an incapacitated client).
This suggests the rule is concerned with emergency situations in which the client might be harmed
by the attorney's inaction. Two cases cited in the Reporter's Note, however, support the general
rule that incapacity of the principal terminates the agent's authority. See id. at 131 (citing
Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Graham v. Graham, 240 P.2d 564 (Wash.
1952).
175. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2.
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ing the rights of a client." '176 The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards are more specific. According to these standards, the client
decides: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive jury trial; and (3)
whether to testify. 177 Decisions about whom to call as witnesses, exami-
nation of these witnesses, juror selection, what motions to proffer, and
all other "strategic and tactical" decisions are reserved to the lawyer,
after consultation with the client.'78 Despite the purported distinctions
between goals and means in the Rules, the Code, and the Standards, the
differences are often vague. 179
At the heart of the attorney-client relationship are the lawyer's
duties of loyalty, 80 zealousness,' 8' and confidentiality to the client. 82
The significant overlap of these duties combine to form a bundle of obli-
gations and client expectations, rather than discrete, compartmentalized
concepts.
Professor Charles Fried describes the attorney's duty of loyalty as
the responsibility to be a "special" or "limited-purpose [l]egal friend." '183
As legal friend, the lawyer adopts her client's legal interests as her own
and becomes both shield and sword. 84 Loyalty has also been described
as "the most basic obligation of any lawyer, an obligation that gives his
work great dignity and purpose-the obligation to serve his clients
rather than to become part of the official machinery that judges
176. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7, EC 7-8.
177. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 4-5.2(a) (1989).
178. See id. § 4-5.2(b). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt.;
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8, EC 7-9.
179. See Spiegel, supra note 159, at 100-04 (discussing the artificiality of the distinction
between means and goals).
180. The comments to Model Rule 1.7 provide, in pertinent part: "Loyalty is an essential
element in the lawyer's relationship to a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7 cmt. 1. See generally id. at Rules 1.7-1.9; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 5; KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 205-06 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. It has been suggested that the
origins of this duty lie in Roman law, stemming from the relationship between master and servant.
See James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REv. 279,
289-90 (1963) (citing Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer
and Client, 16 CAL. L. REv. 487 (1928)).
181. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmLrrY EC 7-1.
182. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. See infra notes 199-201, 227-40, and accompanying text (discussing
this duty).
183. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976). But see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 108 (criticizing Fried's
analogy and suggesting that the attorney-client relationship is more like prostitution than like
friendship); Edward A. Dauer and Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86
YALE L.J. 573 (1977) (responding to Fried).
184. See Fried, supra note 183, at 1071-73.
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them."185
In zealously representing a client, lawyers have always been under
a duty to use every lawful device to achieve the client's goals. 186 Lord
Henry Brougham described the "traditional view" of the attorney's role
during his defense of Queen Caroline:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save the client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in per-
forming this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the conse-
quences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country
in confusion.187
This traditional view is reflected in our adversary system where the
criminal defense attorney is portrayed as the protector of the client.1 88
As such, the attorney is permitted to act with little concern for the truth
and, indeed, may intentionally attempt to manipulate the credibility of
witnesses.189
185. Edward W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 349, 355 (1981).
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 1; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7.
187. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821). For a more recent, but no less
aggressive view of the defense attorney's role, see generally ALAN DERSHOWrrz, THE BEST
DEFENSE (1982); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
For a thoughtful discussion of the tension between personal values and the attorney's role, see
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1975-
1976) (suggesting that the lawyer's role often requires them to be amoral).
188. Kenneth Mann reported: "It's my mission and obligation to defend the client, not to sit in
moral, ethical, or legal judgment of him.... My role in the adversary system is to protect him."
KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 121
(1985). Our popular culture reinforces this view. In the movie To Kill a Mockingbird, the image
of Atticus Finch going to the jail in the middle of the night and guarding the door of his client's
cell speaks volumes about society's perception of the lawyer's role as protector. To KILL A
MOCKINGBIRD (Universal-International 1962); Symposium, To Kill a Mockingbird, 45 ALA. L.
REv. 389 (1994); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv.
181 (1981). See also PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL AsiMow, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM
GOES TO THE MOVIES (1996) (reviewing seventy movies about courtroom lawyers); Anthony
Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American
Attorneys, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (examining treatment of lawyers in movies, television,
and books); Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75
CAL. L. REV. 379 (1987) (examining the treatment of lawyers in books, movies, and philosophy).
189. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
Defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our
system assigns him a different mission.... Defense counsel need present nothing,
even if he knows what the truth is. He need not .. reveal any confidences of his
client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure
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B. The Attorney's Responsibility to the Court
Attorneys serve two masters-the client and the court. 190 Nor-
mally, there is no tension between the two. Attorneys have obligations
as officers of the court. 9 They are forbidden to make affirmative mis-
representations to courts192 or others. 193 And, "[t]here are circumstances
where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation."'' 94 Candor, respect, the professional obligation to
obey court orders, and the promotion of justice are among the lawyer's
responsibilities as an officer of the court.' 95
Representing the mentally impaired criminal defendant does, how-
ever, pose special challenges for attorneys. The competency issue is an
occasion when the attorney's duties to the client and the court may be in
conflict.196 For example, despite the duties of loyalty, and zealousness,
and the duty to keep client confidences and secrets,197 defense counsel is
obligated to inform the court when she has reasonable cause to doubt her
or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest in not convicting the
innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth.... In this
respect.... as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we
countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to
the search for truth.
Id. at 256-58 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
190. In most jurisdictions, courts have regulatory control over attorney admissions to the bar
and attorney discipline.
191. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at Preamble ("A lawyer is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice."). See also Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23, 27
(Ariz. 1986) (stating that a defense attorney has special non-adversarial obligations with respect to
competency).
192. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5); ABA CRIMINAL JusTIcE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 4-
1.2(f) ("Defense counsel should not intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the
court.").
193. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuT Rule 4.1; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(5).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 3.3 cmt. 2.
195. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuT Rule 3.3 cmt. 1; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102; ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
§ 4-1.2(f) ("Defense counsel should not intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the
court.").
196. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2 and accompanying
commentary.
197. The ethical duty is broader than the attorney-client privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 111-112 and accompanying commentary at 121, 129
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996). During the course of the representation, an attorney may
receive information about the client's matter that she is ethically bound not to disclose, but that is
not protected by the privilege.
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client's competency.1 98 Depending on how the competency process
unfolds, the conflict between these competing duties becomes difficult
to resolve.
V. THE DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS
The lawyer's obligation of confidentiality derives from agency law
and the law of evidence. 199 The ethical duty of confidentiality is broader
than the attorney-client privilege in two significant respects. First, client
confidences and other information relating to the representation must be
kept confidential.2 °° Second, the information obtained as a product of
the representation must be kept secret from the world. The attorney-
client privilege, although dictated by the lawyer's duty of loyalty, is a
rule of evidence that only protects against the introduction of client con-
fidences as evidence in a judicial or other governmental proceeding. °1
There are, however, various circumstances under the ethical rules and
attorney-client privilege where the attorney is permitted to disclose
information about the client.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege2 °2 is the dominant focus of the profes-
198. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 266-70 and
accompanying text.
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) ("[A]n agent is subject to a duty to
the principal not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal
or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency ...."). The agent's duty of
confidentiality is subject to exceptions. Disclosure is permitted to protect the agent or a third
person and to prevent a crime. See, e.g., id. § 395 cmt. f; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE supra note
180, at §§ 87-97.
200. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmts. 1-4; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1.
201. See PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:3, at 394
(1993) ("The first [rationale for the attorney-client privilege] was the duty of loyalty the attorney
owed his client, which included the obligation not to testify against his own client."). The second
rationale was to promote full and frank communications. See id. Whether the attorney's
disclosure of client confidences is pursuant to an "exception" to the privilege or disclosure is
considered to be outside the scope of the privilege is not important for purposes of this Article.
See, e.g., Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing the difference
between the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality). Professor Luban suggests
that the rationale for protecting information beyond the client's confidences is that otherwise, the
lawyer may be reluctant to conduct a full investigation. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE 201 (1988). The attorney-client privilege is complemented by the work product doctrine
which provides qualified immunity for ideas and information developed by the attorney or her
agents during the course of the representation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). This
protection was partially codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3) (1997).
202. There are two oft-cited formulations of the privilege. The first is:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in
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sional role of the American lawyer:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the
modem American lawyer's professional functions. It is considered
indispensable to the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that
the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to
disclose everything, bad as well as good.2°3
The attorney and the client can refuse to reveal their communications in
judicial proceedings because of the importance placed on candid com-
munication in the professional relationship. 2" It is an exception to the
important duty of all individuals to disclose relevant evidence in legal
proceedings.2 °5 The privilege is rooted in the belief that the client will
not be truthful with his lawyer absent the guarantee that the client's
secrets will be held inviolate.20 6 The argument in support of this privi-
lege is simple. If the client communicates candidly and completely, the
lawyer will be better able to provide legal advice and steer the client
through a lawful course. 0 7 Furthermore, an adversary system that oper-
ates with fully informed lawyers will produce reliable results.20 8
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 EvmmCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaugh-
ton rev. ed. 1961). Judge Wyzanski devised the second formulation as:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
became a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate [agent] and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of stran-
gers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the pur-
pose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
203. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1978).
204. See EDWARD CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1982) ("The proposition is that the detriment to justice from a power to shut off inquiry to
pertinent facts in court will be outweighed by the benefits to justice (not the client) from a franker
discussion in the lawyer's office."). The attorney-client privilege is often codified in the law of
evidence. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE ArN. §§ 950-962 (West 1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503
(McKinney 1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
205. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); In re LTV Securities Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 600 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386
(1981).
206. See CLEARY, supra note 204, at 175. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 366 (1989) (suggesting that this belief is "simply untrue").
207. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. But see Henry D. Levine, Self-Interest or Self-Defense:
Lawyer Disregard for the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFsTRA L. REV.
783, 787 (1977); Zacharias, supra note 206, at 358-59.
208. See Gardner, supra note 180, at 592; Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 53, at 457;
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Notwithstanding the importance of the attorney-client privilege to
the professional relationship, it is enforced by courts only when neces-
sary to achieve its specific purpose;209 otherwise, enforcement would
deny the fact-finder access to relevant information. This, theoretically,
would have an adverse impact on any search for truth.210  The high cost
of protecting client confidences from disclosure in judicial proceedings
has resulted in a narrow interpretation of the privilege.2 1 Its exceptions,
however, have been interpreted broadly.21 2 Under the privilege, disclo-
sure of client confidences is permissible to reveal an ongoing crime,213
an intentional tort,2 14 or a fraud or the intent to commit one.21 5 The
privilege is waived where the client raises claims or defenses which dis-
close, expressly or impliedly, communications between the attorney and
the client.216 An attorney may also disclose client confidences when the
client challenges the attorney's conduct, competence, or representa-
tion,217 or when it is necessary for the attorney to defend herself against
Levine, supra note 207, at 817-18; LUBAN, supra note 201, at 197 (suggesting that human dignity,
a basis for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination also supports the prohibition
against forced disclosure of a client's statements).
209. See WIGMORE, supra note 202, §§ 2285, 2291: [The] benefits [of the attorney-client
privilege] are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction plain and concrete . . . . It is worth
preserving for the sake of general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of
the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the
logic of its principle."). See also United States v. Sindel, 854 F. Supp. 595, 599 (E.D. Mo. 1994)
(privilege protects only disclosures necessary for informed legal advice and that would not be
made in the absence of a privilege), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 53 F.3d 874 (1995).
210. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994)
("Privileges forbid the admission of otherwise relevant evidence when certain interests the
privileges are thought to protect are regarded as more important than the interests served by the
resolution of litigation based on full disclosure of all relevant facts."). Cf. United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710-13 (1974) (discussing limits on Presidential privileges).
211. RICE, supra note 201, at § 2.3.
212. See id. § 8.2.
213. See Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) (advice in
furtherance of a fraudulent or an unlawful goal is socially perverse, unworthy of protection); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979) (using attorney's services "to further a
continuing or future crime or tort" is inconsistent with the "ultimate aim" of the privilege which is
to promote the proper administration of justice).
214. See, e.g., Diamond v. Stratton, 95 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
215. The relevant inquiry is the client's intent. See RicE, supra note 201, at § 8:4.
216. See, e.g., Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 479-80 (3d Cir. 1995); Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994); Saint-Gobain/Norton
Indus. Ceramics Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 884 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Mass. 1995). See generally
RiCE, supra note 201, §§ 9.1-9.94 (discussing waiver in detail).
217. Thompson v. United States, 7 F.3d 1377, 1378 (8th Cir. 1993); Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d
1043, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1983). The attorney may only disclose confidences that relate to the
substance of the waiver or to the self-defense of the lawyer. Neither the waiver nor self-defense
exceptions authorizes the wholesale disclosure of the client's confidences. See Levine, supra note
207, at 786-818 (discussing history, scope and propriety of this exception).
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such claims by a third party.218 Disclosure can also be required by court
order; however, the attorney must assert the privilege to avoid a finding
of waiver.219
Courts have distinguished among disclosure of client statements,
the attorney's opinion testimony about the client's competency, and tes-
timony about the client's demeanor. The attorney-client privilege does
not bar the attorney from testifying about her observations of the client's
demeanor and her opinion about the client's competency in a post-con-
viction competency hearing,220 as long as the client's statements are not
disclosed.221 In such cases, courts have distinguished between the infor-
mation the attorney obtains through the sense of hearing, which is pro-
tected by the privilege, and information obtained through the sense of
sight, which is not.222 Courts that permit attorneys to testify about infor-
mation they obtained through observation have followed the dominant
view-Wigmore's analysis of the privilege. Wigmore limits the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege to the client's words, except that
any information the client intended to be confidential, no matter the
218. See Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1430 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
(attorney can waive the privilege to protect against third-party accusations even though client does
not agree to waive privilege). See generally Jennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminating "Backdoor"
Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 992 (1990); RICE, supra note 201, §§ 9:54-9:59.
219. See RICE, supra note 201, at § 9.19.
220. See Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1979); Clanton v. United States, 488 F.2d
1069 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964); Howell v. United
States, 282 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1968); People v. Kinder, 512 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987).
221. The notion that the client's statements are truly protected when defense counsel is
permitted to testify to her opinion of her client's competency is reminiscent of Hans Christian
Anderson's fairy tale The Emperor's New Clothes. See also Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d
23, 29 (Ariz. 1986) ("[It defies reality to pretend that the lawyer has formed opinions on
competency without relying on discussions with the defendant."); Pizzi, supra note 26, at 60 (the
lawyer's opinion will almost certainly be based on client communications and it will be difficult to
determine the precise source of the lawyer's opinion); Uphoff, supra note 22, at 91 (same).
222. See Coveney v. Tannahill, 1 Hill 33, 35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) ("This privilege of the client
does not extend to every fact which the attorney may learn in the course of employment. There is
a difference, in principle, between communications made by the client, and acts done by him in
the presence of the attorney."); Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. 191, 211 (1861) ("If a lawyer learns from
professional visits that he has a fool for a client, whether he acquires the knowledge by the want of
intelligent answers, or by study of phrenological developments, the fact is competent evidence in a
proper case, and no rule of law forbids the lawyer from delivering it."); Robson v. Kemp, 170
Eng. Rep. 735, 736 (K.B. 1803) ("One sense is privileged as well as another. [The attorney]
cannot be said to be privileged as to what he hears, but not to what he sees, where the knowledge
acquired as to both has been [derived] from his situation as an attorney."); WIGMORE, supra note
202, § 2306, at 588 ("[W]hether the privileged knowledge of the attorney is restricted to that
which he obtains by the sense of hearing only, or includes also that which he learns by seeing; and
this mode of statement corresponds more closely to the distinction between utterances and acts of
the client.").
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sense through which it was obtained, is also protected. 23
Another view, which is more protective of the privilege and the
attorney-client relationship, bars the attorney's observations and opin-
ions from being disclosed on the ground that they were learned as a
consequence of the attorney-client relationship and thus should be pro-
tected. For example, in Gunther v. United States,z"4 the court com-
mented on the impropriety of receiving testimony from defense counsel:
If trial counsel in a criminal case could be called by the Government
and asked to give an opinion as to the accused's competency and
ability to assist in the defense, he could necessarily also be asked for
the factual data upon which he premised his opinion. These ques-
tions would open to inquiry by the Government the entire relationship
between the accused and his counsel. Such revelations would be a
violation of the attorney-client privilege and would also invade an
accused's right to counsel in the trial of the criminal charge.225
Courts adhering to this view take a holistic approach to the privilege,
focusing on the core relationship it is designed to foster, effectively
preventing the attorney from becoming a witness against her client on
the issue of competency. 26
Generally, the rule is that disclosure of client confidences is barred
by the privilege even when the client may be incompetent. Therefore,
absent a recognized exception to the privilege and the ethical rules, an
223. WIGMoRE, supra note 202, § 2306, at 588. While the privilege does not bar the attorney's
opinion and demeanor testimony regarding the client's competence, such testimony surely violates
the lawyer's duties of loyalty, zealousness, and confidentiality under the ethical rules unless court
ordered.
224. 230 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (the court remanded for a second post-
conviction competency hearing and addressed testimony by the defendant's attorney).
225. Id. at 223-24. Another example of this view is stated in United States v. Kendrick, where
the concurring opinion pointed out that the defense counsel's opinion as to his client's competence
was inseparable from the client's statements:
Any expression as to the client's mental competency necessarily embraced more
than facts observable by anyone; it comprehended conclusions drawn in the course
of an association that is uniquely regarded in the law. The lawyer's observations
were inextricably intertwined with communications which passed between him and
his client. It cannot be said that the testimony was confined to nonconfidential
matters.
331 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1964).
226. See State v. Adams, 283 S.E.2d 582, 586 (S.C. 1981) ("[t]he entire setting of the
confidential conference must be protected as well. To lend privilege to the words spoken but to
allow disclosure of professional impressions drawn from the manner of their delivery all but
destroys the substance of the privilege.") In Adams, the court relied on State v. Doster, which held
that "[t]he privilege is based upon a public policy that the best interest of society is served by
promoting a relationship between the attorney and the client whereby utmost confidence in the
continuing secrecy of all confidential disclosures made by the client within the relationship is
maintained." State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 219 (S.C. 1981).
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attorney representing a client such as Harris cannot disclose the client's
confidences.
B. The Confidentiality Provisions of the Ethical Rules
Agents, in general, owe their principals the duty to keep informa-
tion relative to the relationship confidential.227 But, the lawyer's code of
silence is special.22 It keeps their lips sealed in a way that other agents'
and employees' lips are not.229 The duty of confidentiality professes to
encourage the client to tell everything-even sensitive or embarrassing
facts-without fear that they will be disclosed.230 The fully informed
lawyer will be able to provide more effective representation. The Rules
and the Code provide that information learned about the client will not
be revealed 23 1 unless the client consents, explicitly or implicitly. 23 2
Thus, the attorney is required to protect client confidences, and other
information, relating to the representation.233
Professor Luban describes the lawyer's duty of confidentiality this
way: "Lawyer's, then, are expected to keep their client's confidences.
That is perhaps the most fundamental precept of lawyer's ethics, the one
over which to go to the mat, to take risks, to go to jail for contempt if the
alternative is violating it."'234 "Elemental decency" stemming from the
lawyer's duty of loyalty, including the quality of being trustworthy, is a
component of the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.235
The ethical rules only permit disclosure of client information pursu-
227. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
228. See LUBAN, supra note 201, at 178.
229. See id.
230. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 cmts. 2-4; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1.
231. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6 cmts. 4-5. Under the Model
Code, the lawyer must maintain the confidentiality of information "gained in" the professional
relationship that the client requested be held inviolate "or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely detrimental to the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILIY DR 4-101(A).
232. The Model Rules recognize that "the client has a reasonable expectation that information
relating to the client will not be voluntarily disclosed and that the disclosure of such information
may be judicially compelled only in accordance with recognized exceptions to the attorney-client
and work product privileges." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, at Preamble. See also
id. Rule 1.6(a); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A), (B).
233. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (protecting information "relating
to representation of a client"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBIrY DR 4-101
(protecting information covered by the attorney-client privilege, information gained in the
professional relationship that the client requests be kept confidential, and "embarrassing" and
"detrimental" information).
234. See LUBAN, supra note 201, at 186. But see supra note 218 and accompanying text
(attorney is permitted to disclose client confidences to defend against allegations of third parties).
235. See LUBAN, supra note 201, at 186.
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ant to court order,2 36 when client consent is obtained,2 37 to protect the
lawyer from allegations of wrongful conduct and assist in fee collec-
tion, 238 and when the purpose of the consultation was for commission of
a crime or a fraud.239 A lawyer's failure to keep information about the
client confidential may expose her to disciplinary proceedings. 240
C. The Guidance Provided by the Ethical Rules and the Criminal
Justice Standards for the Attorney Representing the
Impaired Client
Returning momentarily to the Harris illustration, Harris' next
scheduled court appearance is to set a trial date or to enter a plea guilty.
Harris clearly has expressed his wish to avoid a trial. His lawyer, how-
ever, is troubled by Harris' belief in the existence of a conspiracy, which
appears to be influencing his decision to plead guilty. Furthermore, his
lawyer does not understand where, if at all, "John" fits in. What should
Harris' attorney do? A sensible step would be to seek guidance from the
applicable rules of professional responsibility and the studies of the
American Bar Association.241
I. THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND THE
IMPAIRED CLIENT
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct deal with the problem of
the impaired client broadly, without exactitude.242 The Model Rules
urge attorneys representing impaired clients to maintain a normal attor-
236. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 20; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-1O(C)(2).
237. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-1O1(C)(1).
238. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4). This exception generally applies in matters
involving a client, but it is also pertinent in matters involving third parties.
239. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(I) (permitting disclosure to
prevent a client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes will likely result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR
4-101(C)(3) (a lawyer may reveal the client's intention to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent it). But see A Delicate Balance, supra note 7 (recommending that the
disciplinary rules be amended to allow the attorney to reveal the impaired client's confidences in
order to assist the client.).
240. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS §§ 4.21-4.24, at 28-29
(1991) (promulgating graduated punishments ranging from disbarment to admonishment based on
the lawyer's mens rea and the consequential impact on the client).
241. Professor Tremblay finds that the guidance offered by the Model Code and the Model
Rules is "either ... too incoherent and ambiguous to be meaningful or ... unjustified in its
delegation of authority to the lawyer." Tremblay, supra note 4, at 540.
242. The Model Rules treat impairment caused by mental illness like impairment manifested
by minors. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a).
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ney-client relationship,243 and permit them to seek the appointment of a
guardian, or other form of protection, only if the lawyer "reasonably
believes" the client cannot act in his own best interests. 2" This rule,
however, apparently envisions the lawyer acting as a de facto guardian
with some frequency.245 The language of the rule does not direct the
lawyer to act as guardian to her client. Nor does the rule, or comments
thereto, cite to any authority or reasons for deviating from the normal
practice that the attorney acts as an agent of the client, and that an
incompetent principal nullifies the agent's authority to act.246
The tension among the lawyer's duties of loyalty, zealousness, and
confidentiality, and the failure of the Model Rules to provide sufficient
guidance is reflected in Comment 5 to Rule 1.14: "disclosure of the
client's disability can adversely affect the client's interests ... [because
it could] lead to... involuntary commitment. The lawyer's position in
such cases is an unavoidably difficult one. '247 The Model Rules, how-
243. See id. The Model Rules refer to the impaired client's "ability to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with the representation," id., which is similar to the language
of the Model Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIEiLrrY EC 7-12.
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(b). See also ABA Formal Op.
96-404, supra note 3 (suggesting that seeking appointment of a guardian should be a last resort).
245. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. 2 ("[T]he lawyer often must
act as de facto guardian."). In the final draft of Model Rule 1.14(b), the permissive "may"
replaced the mandatory "shall," thus giving the lawyer the option of seeking a guardian. Both the
Model Rules and Model Code permit counsel to act as de facto guardians. Professor Tremblay
has observed that, notwithstanding the likelihood that lawyers may be as able as anyone to act as
guardians, other professionals, notably physicians and psychiatrists, are not permitted to act as de
facto guardians. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 571-72 & n.241. See also supra notes 2, 3, 169,
174, and accompanying text.
246. Professor Tremblay, observing that the rule permits the lawyer act in the absence of either
client authorization or court approval, referred to this conduct as "lawlessness." Tremblay, supra
note 4, at 546. See also Jan E. Rein, Clients With Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-
What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1101, 1138 (1994) ("Between subsections (a) and (b) of [Model] Rule 1.14, [ ] the assumptions
make an unannounced turn that leaves the lawyer representing the client without any recognized
basis for doing so."). See supra notes 2, 3, 169, 174, and accompanying text.
247. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt. 5. With respect to disabled
non-clients in emergency situations, the ABA recently amended the comments to Model Rule 1.14
to clarify the lawyer's prerogatives. An "emergency" is defined as an occasion where the "health,
safety, or a financial interest [of the disabled individual] is threatened with imminent and
irreparable harm .... MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmts. 6, 7 (1998
ed.). The comments also obligate the lawyer to attempt to stabilize the attorney-client relationship
as quickly as possible and suggest that compensation should not be sought for the emergency
services rendered. Id. The amendment was designed to address "rare situations" of genuine
emergencies and where no other lawyers or agents are representing the individual. Id. Remarks
of Lawrence J. Fox, Chair ABA Ethics Committee. The amended comments permit lawyers to
reveal confidences of the disabled individual "to the extent necessary to accomplish the intended
protective action," but still prohibit the general disclosure of client confidences. Id. See also
ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 132 (2d ed. 1995)
(interpreting Model Rule 1.14 to permit disclosures of client confidences that the lawyer
reasonably believes are in the client's best interests).
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ever, do not allow disclosure of the impaired client's confidences.
2. THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
IMPAIRED CLIENT
Under the Model Code, client communications indicating the cli-
ent's incompetence are privileged and confidential.248 The Model Code
is flexible, providing the lawyer with authority over virtually any course
of action, while failing to provide structure for decision-making.
Although there is no disciplinary rule regarding impaired clients,249 the
ethical considerations impose additional responsibilities on the attorney
for a client who, because of a physical or a mental condition, is "incapa-
ble of making a considered judgment on his own behalf."250 In the
absence of a legal representative, the attorney may make decisions for
the client in court as long as those decisions "safeguard and advance the
[client's] interests"25' and do not include decisions that are reserved to
the client by law.252
Illustrating the lack of guidance to the attorney representing an
impaired client is the Model Code's failure to explain the meaning of
"best interests." For example, is it a "substituted judgment" standard
(what the client would have decided); or, is it simply the attorney's judg-
ment about what is best for the client?253 The Model Code also does not
provide any basis for substituting the client's authority with that of the
248. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (prohibiting
disclosures that would be embarrassing or that might be detrimental to the client.).
249. But see A Delicate Balance, supra note 7, at 42-46 (proposing amendment to New York's
Code of Professional Responsibility to permit disclosure of an impaired client's confidences for
the purpose of helping the client).
250. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12.
251. Id. No reason is stated that would permit a lawyer to make decisions for the client in
court. The drafters may have believed that by the time the matter was "in court," the client had
already identified objectives such that the lawyer was simply carrying them out. On the other
hand, the drafters may have found comfort in having judicial officers implement the decisions,
rather than permitting the attorney to unilaterally make and execute decisions. See Tremblay,
supra note 4, at 543. Theoretically, the first reason appears sufficient, but some record of the
lawyer's assumption of control should be made. The second possible reason is clearly inadequate.
252. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12. This proscription does not
differ from the general rule that directs lawyers to make strategy decisions, while preserving the
goals or objective decisions to the client. Professor Tremblay suggests that "[a] more sensible
construction is that EC 7-12 permits the lawyer to make decisions that otherwise would be
'exclusively' for the client under EC 7-7." Tremblay, supra note 4, at 542. However, the
language of EC 7-12 states that the lawyer "cannot perform any act or make any decision which
the law requires his client to perform or make." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY
EC 7-12.
253. Since the Model Code has identified a client's inability to make a "considered judgment"
as the trigger, an advocacy standard would be inappropriate. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 543.
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lawyer's, permitting the attorney to make decisions for the client.21 4
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code mandates disclosure, leav-
ing the decision entirely to the lawyer's discretion.25
3. THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS AND THE
IMPAIRED CLIENT
The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards contain
detailed criteria that address complexities involved in the legal represen-
tation of the impaired client.256 The ABA Standards treat competency as
a cornerstone of the adversary system 2 7 and recognize agency princi-
ples, such as the right of criminal defendants to control their defense,258
the inability of incompetent defendants to exercise that right,25 9 and the
difficulty of accurately determining the best interests of a client.2 °
The ABA Standards resolve the tension between the attorney's con-
flicting role obligations as an officer of the court, responsible for main-
taining the integrity of the adversary system, and as a loyal and zealous
advocate for her client. That tension is resolved in favor of the for-
mer.261 Counsel is obligated to the court, as well as to the fair adminis-
tration of justice.26 2 The lawyer's duty to the court prohibits her from
going forward with plea proceedings or trial with an incompetent client
because it would violate due process. 263 This responsibility requires that
counsel move for a mental evaluation of her client even when she
believes such an evaluation would not serve her client's "legal best
interests.'2 4
254. Professor Tremblay assumes that the drafters relied on principles of agency and implied
consent. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 543 n. 116.
255. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C).
256. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2(c) and accompanying
commentary.
257. See id. § 7-4.1 and accompanying commentary.
258. See id. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975) (the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the defendant the right to personally participate in and control the defense); Bishop v.
Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23, 25 (1986) (same).
259. See supra notes 2, 3, 169, and 174.
260. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2(c) and accompanying
commentary ("In addition, to permit defense counsel to proceed to trial with incompetent clients
deprives defendants of their personal right to participate in and to control the thrust of their
defense. It further assumes that defense attorneys properly determine the best interests of their
clients."). Id. at 180. Cf Faretta, 422 U.S. 806.
261. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2(c) and accompanying
commentary.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 180. ("Because the trial of an incompetent defendant necessarily is invalid as a
violation of due process, a defense lawyer's duty to maintain the integrity of judicial proceedings
requires that a trial court be advised of the defendant's possible incompetence.").
264. See id. § 7-4.2(b) commentary, at 178.
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Defense counsel is acknowledged to possess information essential
to ascertain her client's ability to rationally understand the process and
to rationally assist with his defense.265 A good faith doubt about a cli-
ent's competency is sufficient grounds to move for an evaluation, even
over the client's objection.2 6 6 Although "specific facts" supporting the
good faith doubt must be reduced to writing,267 the lawyer cannot
divulge confidential information or statements protected by the attorney-
client privilege.268
Similarly, at the competency hearing, the attorney is urged to
"relate to the court personnel [presumably the judge] observations of and
conversations with the defendant, '269  but "confidential communica-
tions" may not be disclosed and the attorney-client privilege cannot be
violated. 7 0  Cross-examination regarding testimonial observations and
conversations is permissible, but caution must be exercised to ensure
confidential statements, or other information within the privilege, are not
revealed.271 The court may also question defense counsel about the
defendant's ability to communicate and the quality of the attorney-client
relationship; but again, the substance of confidential communications, or
other matters protected by the privilege, may not be divulged. More-
over, the prosecution may not cross-examine defense counsel on sub-
jects raised by the court.272
In sum, protecting the possibly incompetent client's statements
265. See id. § 7-4.8(b)(i) and accompanying commentary ("A defense attorney not only is in
close and continuing communication with a client, but he or she also knows the extent to which
presentation of substantive and factual defenses may turn on the client's ability to understand
them and assist counsel in advancing them."). Id. at 211-12.
266. See id. § 7-4.2(c). The standards do not address the type or the amount of information
that would equate to a "good faith" doubt about the client's competency. This may be because
each case will turn on its own facts. It seems clear, however, that isolated odd acts or statements
by a defendant, who in all other respects appears competent, would be insufficient to justify
raising the issue. Before subjecting the client to a competency evaluation, defense counsel should
have a good faith belief that the client is incompetent, not simply that the client has done or said
something that is odd.
267. See id. § 7-4.2(d). The lawyer may make the application orally if making it in writing
"might deleteriously affect the attorney-client relationship." The possibility that attorney may
have to move for withdrawal is acknowledged. Id.
268. See id. § 7-4.2(f). See also id. § 7-3.3(b) (disclosures made by the defendant or the
attorney during the course of the evaluation are protected by the attorney-client privilege); id. § 7-
3.4(b) (in court-ordered evaluations upon prosecution request, the expert shall notify prosecution
and defense of clinical findings and opinions, but shall not refer to the defendant's statements).
269. Id. § 7-4.8(b)(i). "Conversations" is not defined.
270. The distinction between "conversations" with the client and "confidential
communications" in this context is not clear, since revelation of client confidences, as part of the
attorney-client privilege, is prohibited.
271. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8(b)(i). See also People
v. Kinder, 521 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
272. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8(b)(ii).
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forces courts to rely on unchallenged, conclusory testimony. Thus,
courts are deprived of the most compelling evidence determinative of
the competency issue-the defendant's own statements. 73
Unfortunately, as the foregoing demonstrates, much of the advice
offered by the Model Rules, the Model Code, and the ABA Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards is internally inconsistent. In some
respects, it is contrary to the law of agency. None of the wisdom con-
tained in these schemes satisfactorily answers the dilemma facing attor-
neys who represent impaired defendants.
Other possible options do exist, however.274 For example, under
certain circumstances, an attorney can withdraw from the representation.
In court proceedings, judicial permission is generally required. 275 Most
judges in criminal cases are not enthusiastic about motions to withdraw,
especially when the client may be impaired. Even if the motion is
granted, the problem simply gets shifted to another attorney. Or, the
problem may "disappear" in the sense that the defendant may not relay
the information to the substituted lawyer because it may result in another
withdrawal. In addition, the attorney's role as a counselor requires that
she attempt to get her client to understand the consequences of his
choices and to steer her client away from harmful choices.276 Quite
often, however, the hours spent counseling clients prove fruitless.
Although advocated by some,277 acting as a de facto guardian in a
criminal case has constitutional implications, as well as raising questions
under agency law. Since in a criminal case the client is required to make
certain choices, permitting the lawyer to make the incompetent client's
choices seems unconstitutional.278 On the other hand, if the lawyer has
273. The commentary to the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards states, without
elaboration, that permitting disclosure of client confidences was considered and rejected. See id.
§ 7-4.8(b)(i) commentary, at 213.
274. Professor Tremblay has identified six possible options for an attorney representing an
impaired client in the civil context: (1) move to withdraw; (2) seek appointment of a guardian,
either by acting as petitioner or by recruiting a third party; (3) seek unofficial consent from a
family member or close friend of the client (i.e., rely on family as proxy decision maker); (4) seek
to persuade the client to do what the lawyer thinks is appropriate; (5) act as a de facto guardian;
and (6) presume competence and follow the client's wishes even if the result will be disastrous.
Tremblay, supra note 4, at 519-20 (adding that withdrawal should be avoided if possible). Cf.
ABA Formal Op. 96-404, supra note 3 (discussing the problems involved in withdrawal). All of
these alternatives compromise the attorney-client relationship.
275. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16 cmt. 3; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESFONSIBiLI'Y DR 2-11 0(A)(1).
276. Even Professors Binder, Bergman, and Price, strong proponents of client-centered
decision making and lawyer neutrality, recognize the appropriate use of interference when the
client's decision will result in substantial economic, social or psychological harm in return for
little gain. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 172, at 282-86.
277. See infra Part VI.D.
278. See infra notes 304-07 and accompanying text.
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reasonable cause to doubt the client's competence, but still follows the
client's instructions, this problem causes the same result.279
VI. ALLOWING CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL TO DISCLOSE CLIENT
CONFIDENCES IN COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS
Proceeding against an incompetent criminal defendant potentially
harms both the defendant and society's perception of a fair and just legal
system.280 This threat to the integrity of the system justifies the creation
of a limited exception to the attorney-client privilege and the ethical
rules for disclosure of client confidences zS1 in cases involving a defend-
ant's possible incompetency.
In substantiating the attorney's professional role, the privilege, and
the controlling legal ethics, the defense attorney-who possesses impor-
tant information about her client's competence-has been virtually elim-
inated from the process. As a result, Harris and other similarly situated
defendants who do not disseminate their digressions outside the attor-
ney-client relationship appear deceptively competent. Currently, judi-
cial inquiry to determine a defendant's competence relies too heavily on
the judgments of mental health professionals. Moreover, these experts
often know little about the legal capabilities required of a criminal
defendant. Thus, they view the defendant through a therapeutic, rather
than through a forensic, lens.282 Even when the mental health profes-
sionals acquire information to suggest that the defendant is incompetent,
defense counsel's assessment of her client's rational ability to assist in
his own defense would greatly assist the fact finder in determining
competence.
The solution to the dilemma faced by Harris' counsel, and other
attorneys representing possibly incompetent clients, is to permit the dis-
closure of client confidences solely for the purpose of determining com-
petency.283 Various exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and the
279. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
280. Society also has significant interests in preventing the competent defendant from being
found incompetent. These interests include the rights of crime victims, the prompt resolution of
criminal charges, and the reduction of risks (i.e., disappearing witnesses, fading memories, or lost
or stale evidence). These interests, while not implicating fundamental constitutional values, are
sufficiently compelling to permit disclosure of client confidences that demonstrate competence,
particularly because the lawyer's testimony will be afforded significant protections, preventing its
use for any other purpose. Cf People v. Kinder, 512 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
281. The ethical rules require attorneys to keep all information relating to the client
confidential, not just those communications protected by the attorney-client privilege. A key
premise for my proposal is that information in defense counsel's possession is not otherwise
available; disclosure of client information, therefore, should be limited to client confidences that
are not otherwise available from other sources.
282. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
283. The standard to be applied for determining the feasibility of adopting this limited
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confidentiality provisions of ethical rules already exist. These exceptions
have not destroyed the legal order of our judicial system.2 84  Similarly,
this proposal will not alter that reality.
Any proposal seeking to modify the ethical rules, and a rule as old
and venerated as the attorney-client privilege, is bound to elicit objec-
tions. Opponents of permitting lawyers to disclose client confidences
for the purpose of determining competency submit four arguments in
support of their position: (1) the duty of confidentiality should not be
violated; (2) the ethical duties of loyalty and zealousness should not be
violated; (3) the prosecution would be advantaged by the disclosed state-
ments; and (4) impaired criminal defendants should have the same rights
as non-impaired defendants.
A. The Importance of Confidentiality and Its Limits for the Possibly
Incompetent Defendant
The rationale behind the attorney-client privilege is that confidenti-
ality assures free and open communication between the client and the
lawyer, enabling the lawyer to guide the client along a lawful course.
This also serves as the basis for the confidentiality provisions of the
ethical rules.285 Critics of my proposed exception will likely argue that
permitting disclosure will inevitably discourage clients from telling their
attorneys the complete truth, contrary to the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege and the ethical rules. Any response to such an argument
exception should balance the cost of this exception against its benefits. See Zacharias, supra note
206, at 408. In some respects, this proposal is similar to Professor Pizzi's argument that defense
counsel has a special responsibility to protect the defendant's constitutional right to be prosecuted
only when competent, and that asserting the attorney-client privilege should not interfere with the
court's determination of whether an attorney-client relationship exists. See Pizzi, supra note 26, at
61-63. The image of the possibly incompetent client being so close to a vegetative state that
judicial inquiry to determine capacity to even enter the relationship, is artificial. In such a case,
the lawyer's information would be superfluous. Clients who are mentally impaired can still enter
into the attorney-client relationship. See BrAKFI, supra note 42, at 682.
284. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 206, at 408 n.276 (comparing other legal systems that provide
exceptions to the duty of confidentiality). 7
285. See supra Part V. Under the ethical rules, the duty of confidentiality includes information
relating to the representation, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a), secrets,
and client confidences. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(A). This
broader duty, however, is relatively new. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
ETHics 245 (1992). According to Professors Rhode and Luban, this obligation is not addressed in
the earliest works on legal ethics in the United States and it appears to have originated in the Field
Code of 1849. See id. The Field Code defined one obligation of attorneys as "maintain[ing]
inviolate the confidences, and, at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets, of his clients." Id.
This definition formed the basis for a similar rule in the 1908 ABA Cannons and subsequently,
was incorporated in the Model Rules and Model Code. See id. See also Daly, supra note 168, at
1617-19. The rationale behind the ethical rules includes the maintenance of loyalty and integrity
of the attorney-client relationship.
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depends largely on balancing the importance of confidentiality 286 with
the importance of determining competence. Although both values are
significant in our justice system, competence is more important.
Competency determinations are more important because our adver-
sarial system cannot function reliably without competent parties. As a
threshold matter, we must be able to make a reliable determination as to
competence in order to meaningfully commence the process. Proceed-
ings against an incompetent defendant are fundamentally unfair and vio-
late the due process guarantee of the U.S. Constitution.287 Our society
will not tolerate the prosecution of helpless, deranged defendants.
Moreover, the privilege is utilitarian in nature.288  Both the privi-
lege and the confidentiality provisions of the ethical rules are based on
the belief that, in the long run, society and the client benefit from the
private nature of the attorney-client relationship.289 The benefits of fully
informing the attorney outweigh the costs imposed by requiring strict
confidentiality. The underlying assumption is that the client will tell the
lawyer everything essential to adequate representation if the secrecy to
which the attorney must adhere is assured.290 This assumption has been
questioned on the basis of empirical studies291 and is, therefore, espe-
cially difficult to accept for the impaired client. Arguably, the impaired
client's statements do not warrant protection because they are not the
product of a rational mind and the privilege assumes the client is
rational. Consider, for instance, Harris' ramblings about being a witness
to the plot to kill President Kennedy, or Blohm's belief in a golf conspir-
acy, or Lafferty's religious commands. There is no value in keeping
286. A rule that asserts that client statements are protected is important for symbolic value.
See Pearse v. Pearse, 11 Jar. 52, 55 ("Truth like all good things may be loved unwisely, may be
pursued too keenly, may cost too much."); State v. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770, 783 (1882).
287. See cases cited supra note 53.
288. See Daly, supra note 168, at 1624; Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of
Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IowA L. REV. 1091, 1159-72 (1985) (characterizing the
rule as "instrumental"); RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 285, at 224 (same).
289. See supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text. See also generally Subin, supra note
288, at 1159-72. Professor Subin argues that the strict rule of confidentiality is based on client
rights and, to the extent that it assumes that the lawyer will dissuade the client from wrongful
conduct, is instrumental. Additionally, the lawyer should disclose client confidences in situations
wherein serious harm could occur. See id.
290. Professor Subin observed that the "rights-based" justification for confidentiality rests, in
part, on the claim that clients will not be fully candid without confidentiality. See id. at 1160-63.
He argues that this claim lacks empirical support, is "intuitive," and ignores "competing
propositions, equally intuitive, but of equal or greater persuasive force." Id. at 1163.
291. See Zacharias, supra note 206, at 376-82 (purporting to conduct an empirical study of
community awareness of confidentiality). See also Comment, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
YALE L.J. 1226 (1962) (survey revealed significant misinformation about the attorney-client
privilege).
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these delusional statements confidential. Conversely, disclosure of them
will not only benefit the client, it will benefit society as well-by pre-
serving the integrity of the system.292
The privilege and the confidentiality provisions normally protect
the individual client. But the possibly incompetent client does not profit
from the attorney's forced silence. On the contrary, the attorney's
silence may result in substantial harm to the client-finding the incom-
petent defendant to be competent and proceeding to trial will likely
result in a conviction. As a result, the incompetent defendant has perma-
nently lost an important set of rights and has only a remote chance of
vindication on appeal.2 93 The possibly incompetent client whose confi-
dences are not disclosed would then find himself irreparably harmed.
Thus, neither the attorney-client privilege nor the duties of confidential-
ity outlined in the ethical rules of conduct should act as a bar to disclo-
sure of a client's statements.
As proposed, such an exception is justified when compared with
the reasons for the existing exceptions to the attorney-client privilege
and the circumstances under which the ethical rules permit disclosure. 94
Public policy considerations prohibit attorneys from assisting clients in
the commission of crimes, frauds, or intentional torts. Waiver of the
privilege is generally left to the client's discretion, 95 and fairness dic-
tates that the attorney be permitted to disclose client statements in self-
defense.2 96
The rationale for permitting disclosure of statements by the possi-
bly incompetent client2 97 is different than that underlying the other
exceptions, 298 but it is no less compelling. Correctly resolving compe-
tency issues is at least as important as permitting disclosure of client
confidences that are evidence of a future or ongoing crime, tort, or fraud,
and the self-defense exception (even as to claims by third parties).
292. Some may disagree with this position. The disagreement, however, is about when
paternalism or interference is warranted, not whether it is ever justified.
293. On the other hand, the competent client who is found to be incompetent suffers some
hardship for a relatively short period during which he is typically confined, pending periodic
review. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4142 (1984) (providing for in-patient evaluation and periodic
review). But see WEXLER & WrNICK, supra note 27, at 25-36 (arguing that the referral for, and
process of, evaluating competency, itself, stigmatizes the client and has an antitherapeutic effect).
After review, the defendant will almost certainly be found competent; if not, he will be subject to
civil commitment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(c)(4)(C), (D) (1984). Thus, only a small number
of defendants remain incompetent long enough to be civilly committed. See Winick, supra note
51, at 932-33.
294. See supra Part IV.B.
295. See supra note 213-19 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 217-18 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 209-26 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 212-19, 236-39, and accompanying text.
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Indeed, since it benefits both society and the client, disclosure is argua-
bly more important than silence under specific circumstances.
Critics may argue that by creating an exception to the attorney-
client privilege, its sanctity will gradually erode. This contention consti-
tutes a "slippery slope" and has no completely satisfactory answer
because it depends on predictions about the future. It is noteworthy,
however, that a number of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and
ethical rules already exist and the confidentiality requirement has lost
none of its effect. Although exceptions have a tendency to swallow a
rule, that will not happen under this proposed limited exception. The
proposed exception is applicable in a very narrow circumstance in which
genuine questions about the client's competence are raised. It will not
descend down a slippery slope.
B. The Ethical Rules
Consider the following scenario: As criminal defense counsel, you
appear at the arraignment proceeding as appointed counsel to a defend-
ant charged with disorderly conduct (urinating in public). After intro-
ducing yourself, the client refers to you as "Your Majesty" and begins to
talk about the monarchy in England in the 1800s. Despite your efforts,
your client will not talk about anything else; however, he did reply
affirmatively when you told him of the charge against him. When your
case is called, the judge calls you and the prosecutor to the bench for
purposes of disposition. The judge is amenable to the guilty plea and
sentence of time served as offered by the prosecution (in this jurisdiction
the client is not required to allocute to violations). Should you: (A)
Plead the client guilty; or (B) ask for a competency evaluation?
The lawyer's duties of loyalty, zealousness, and responsibility as an
officer of the court are implicated by this example. If you raise the com-
petency issue, your client will obviously be confined for evaluation2 99
longer than the criminal disposition of the case.3" Since many criminal
defense attorneys define zealous advocacy as "getting the client off' or
obtaining the most lenient sentence possible, 0 1 defense counsel likely
sees herself as "responsible" for the time the client spends confined for
the competency evaluation.30 2
299. Despite serious problems associated with incompetency commitments, such as non-
existent or inadequate treatment, most defendants are ultimately found competent-many by
virtue of the treatment they received. See Winick, supra note 51, at 932-33.
300. Cf Uphoff, supra note 22, at 102-03; Winick, supra note 51, at 947.
301. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
302. See Subin, supra note 288, at 1169 (suggesting that proponents of strict confidentiality
would find it "emotionally unacceptable" to participate in a system that would require the attorney
to be a "whistle-blower"). See also ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-
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Properly understanding the defense lawyer's role in competency
matters provides an answer. In a criminal case, decision making is gov-
erned by the ethical rules3 03 and the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution
clearly requires that certain decisions be made by the defendant. For
example, the decision about how to plead,3" whether to waive the right
to a jury trial,3"5 and whether to waive the right against self-incrimina-
tion and to testify3° are all choices that are reserved to the client. The
defense attorney who proceeds with a guilty plea or proceeds to trial
despite reasonable cause to believe the defendant is incompetent violates
the ethical rules and deprives the client of his constitutional right to
make those decisions.3 7  Thus, the notion that loyalty or zealousness
permit the criminal defense attorney to act on behalf of the possibly
incompetent criminal defendant is doubtful as a matter of ethical rules
and constitutional law.
In addition, under the ethical rules, all attorneys have an affirmative
duty to avoid perpetrating a fraud on the court.308 If counsel does not
raise the competency issue when she has reasonable cause to believe her
client is incompetent (and there is no notice from another source), the
lawyer's silence may violate this duty.3 ° 9 In a typical case, the lawyer's
activities are explicitly or implicitly authorized by the client. The court
is entitled to infer that the lawyer's conduct is authorized because of the
lawyer's duty to raise the competency issue.310 Under such circum-
4.2(c). "The conflict, if it exists, arises from a perceived pragmatic failure of the criminal justice
system to live up to its promise, in that the deficiencies in the system of incompetence evaluation
and treatment implicitly threaten excessive or inappropriate sanctions against defendants." Id. at
194-95. See also Chemhoff & Schaffer, supra note 31, at 513 (describing conditions at mental
health facilities used to diagnose and treat criminal defendants).
303. See supra notes 242-79 and accompanying text.
304. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1966)); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
305. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418 n.24 (citing Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind. 1984));
Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751; Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
306. See Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751; United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir.
1992).
307. Furthermore, despite the arguments of some commentators, there are no exceptions to the
requirement that a criminal defendant be competent. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116
S. Ct. 1373 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960).
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102. See also Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966)
("Regardless of [defense counsel's] personal views, he may not withhold from the court such
critical information as the diagnosed mental incompetency of his client and of his consequent
possible inability to stand trial.").
309. ABA CRImINAL JuSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2 commentary, at 180 (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1)).
310. See supra notes 27, 41, 49, 62, and accompanying text.
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stances, an argument could be made that by not raising the issue of com-
petency, the attorney has perpetrated a fraud on the court.3"1
Professor Uphoff disagrees with this position. He contends that the
criminal defense attorney's role often requires her to act in ways that
frustrate the search for truth.31 2 Traditionally, defense counsel has been
permitted to withhold information from the authorities and to create mis-
leading impressions during cross-examination and in closing argument.
Therefore, Professor Uphoff claims that defense counsel's decision not
to raise the issue of competence does not constitute a fraud on the
court.3 1 3
The extensive latitude granted to defense counsel does not provide
an acceptable answer to this argument.3 4 Impeaching witnesses she
believes are being truthful or making misleading arguments in closing
remarks is profoundly different from allowing the defense attorney to act
without authority while implicitly presenting a contrary position to the
court. The former is a function of our adversarial system, which places
demands on the criminal defense lawyer and dictates the lengths to
which society is prepared to go to avoid convicting the innocent defend-
ant-all of which occurs in a public setting under the supervision of a
judge and countered by the role of the prosecutor. The latter permits the
determination of whether the defendant can even participate in the
adversary system to be made by the defense attorney in complete isola-
tion, in contravention of the checks and balances contained in the adver-
sary system.
Furthermore, the ethical rules prohibit an attorney from testifying
as a witness while acting as an advocate in the same matter. As the
dissent in Medina3 15 suggests, the exception should not be adopted
because it violates this prohibition. 316 One reason for this prohibition is
that impeachment of the lawyer as a witness, could adversely affect the
lawyer's credibility as an advocate of the defendant.3 17 But the fact that
the defense attorney may be the only witness possessing particular infor-
311. Silence in the face of reasonable cause to believe the client is incompetent also implicates
defense counsel's role as agent. See supra note 26-39, 192-94, and accompanying text.
312. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 89-90. Professor Uphoff acknowledges that the ABA
Standards' claim, that failure to disclose doubt about a client's competency, may constitute a false
statement of material fact. See id. at 90.
313. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 91.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting).
315. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 466-67 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
316. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B). The lawyer may testify if the matter is uncontested, a formality,
related to collection of a fee, or if preclusion would result in a substantial hardship for the client.
See id.
317. See McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 660 (Alaska 1977). This concern is grounded in
the lawyer's duty of loyalty. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
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mation,318 as well as recognizing that the competency issue and this
exception impose different obligations on the defense attorney, should
minimize the risk that the lawyer's testimony will be misconstrued.319
Because testimony about competence is not directed at the merits of the
criminal case, the prohibition against the lawyer as a witness should not
apply. 320
Consequently, the defense attorney would have to be relieved and
new counsel appointed or retained. The successor attorney would have
to advocate what the client wants during the competency hearing and in
subsequent proceedings. 321 However, the destruction of the first attor-
ney-client relationship is no more significant than any other circum-
stance that might disqualify defense counsel.322
C. The Risk That Disclosed Statements Will Be Used by the
Prosecution
In view of the nature of the competency inquiry, it is likely that the
attorney's testimony would include the defendant's admissions or infor-
mation leading to the discovery of other evidence. Skeptics may object
to this proposal for fear that the defense attorney's testimony, or its
fruits, could be used against the defendant at a trial on the criminal
charges. This raises the possibility that the prosecution could use the
competency process to gather information about the defense's theories
and strategy. The following scenario illustrates such a concern.
Suppose that one of the guards in the jail where Harris is being held
before trial overheard Harris talking to "John" about the JFK conspiracy
and tells the prosecutor. The prosecutor informs the expert appointed to
conduct the competency evaluation, who then asks Harris about "John"
318. See United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A. 1988). Reviewing the disqualification of
defense counsel who testified at his client's pre-trial competency hearing with the client's consent,
the court stated that: "No one but [the defense attorney] was in a position to offer the testimony
which he gave-only he had the insight into the difficulty which his client had with remembering
counsel's instructions and advice, and he, uniquely, could detail the practical inability of
representing Baca when Baca was unable to participate in his defense." Id. at 117-18. The
concurring opinion of Judge Cox suggests that the issue of competency, like the issue of speedy
trial, is collateral for purposes of the rule, and that disqualification would not normally be
required. See id. at 120. But if defense counsel's credibility was put in issue and the court found
against counsel's position, there may be a spill over effect on other issues.
319. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8 commentary
(permitting defense attorney to testify with caution and suggesting that counsel is not in an
adversary role when testifying). But see McKinney, 566 P.2d at 660.
320. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8 commentary.
321. See, e.g., Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v.
Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
322. For example, disqualification resulting from conflicts would have similar effects. Cf
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7-1.11; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsoNSmILrrv Canon 5.
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and the conspiracy. Harris denies knowing anything about either. The
expert notes this in her report and suggests that if the information were
true, Harris might be experiencing delusions and thus may not be com-
petent. But based on the available information, the expert thinks Harris
is competent, although she recommends additional information be gath-
ered. The prosecutor then contacts defense counsel and threatens to call
her as a witness at a competency hearing unless defense counsel can
offer assurances that her client is competent.
The response to this scenario depends on the adequacy of the pro-
tection afforded the disclosure of client communications. Since the
competency inquiry determines whether the defendant can proceed to
trial, both the defendant and society stand to benefit from that determi-
nation. Therefore, the prosecution should not be able to profit from the
defense attorney's testimony or its fruits, once disclosed solely for the
purpose of resolving the competency issue.323
Courts have protected the defendant's statements in comparable cir-
cumstances. In certain situations, the Constitution forbids the forced
surrender of one constitutional right in order to assert another. 324 To
avoid this forced surrender of the defendant's due process right-to pro-
ceed only while competent-in favor of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, neither the defense attorney's nor the defend-
ant's statements, nor their fruits, should be admissible for any purpose
other than resolving issues of the defendant's mental condition.325
Many jurisdictions provide statutory protections for a defendant's
statements made to mental health experts 326 and to the court3 2 7 at a com-
petency hearing. Mental health professionals are also prevented from
testifying at trial or at the sentencing phase using information learned
323. Cf ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §§ 7-3.3, 7-3.3(b) (statements
made by defense counsel and defendant during the course of evaluation are protected by the
attorney-client privilege) and Levine, supra note 207, at 824 (suggesting that attorney's disclosure
of client confidences under self-defense rationale be protected from any other use).
324. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (finding that a defendant's
statements in a motion to suppress based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, could not be
used at trial because it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should be surrendered in order
to assert another."); United States v. Pavelko, 992 F.2d 32, 34 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that the
defendant's financial affidavit and testimony of the agent who witnessed defendant's statements to
magistrate judge in order to obtain assignment of counsel could not be used against the defendant
at trial).
325. Cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (limiting use of defendant's statements to issues involving
mental condition when raised by the defendant); United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1042
(3d Cir. 1975).
326. See, e.g., FED. R. CIMi. P. 12.2.
327. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. L. § 730.20 (5) (McKinney 1992); People v. Grisset, 460
N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (protecting the defendant's statements in response to a
competency inquiry by the court).
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during the competency phase. 328 This protection is derived from the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against eliciting compelled statements
from those charged with criminal conduct.329 Providing protection to
the defendant's statements made to examining doctors and courts, but
not protecting the same statements when repeated by an attorney at a
competency hearing, would defeat the principles underlying this ban.
By providing use and derivative use immunity, 330 no penalty will attach
to the defendant's statements without undue concern that the informa-
tion elicited would be improperly used in subsequent proceedings.
Thus, defense counsel could be obliged to participate in the compe-
tency determination.3 3 '
Furthermore, it may be asserted that precluding the prosecution
from using defense counsel's testimony or its fruits for any purpose
other than the resolution of issues of the defendant's mental condition
frustrates the search for truth.332 In other contexts, typically where gov-
ernmental misconduct results in the judicial suppression of evidence, the
prosecution is permitted to use suppressed evidence to impeach the
defendant's testimony.333 The justification for permitting impeachment,
however, is inapposite to allowing defense counsel's testimony to be
used for impeachment. The suppression of evidence in the case of gov-
ernmental misconduct is based on an exclusionary rule designed to deter
law enforcement officers from violating constitutional rights.334 As the
deterrent effect becomes attenuated, truth becomes more important than
deterrence, and the evidence becomes admissible for impeachment pur-
poses.335 Therefore, cases treating the defense attorney's testimony as
compelled are more analogous.
Finally, due to the importance of the various conflicting interests,
the judge should be especially vigilant in avoiding inappropriate and
unnecessary questioning of defense counsel and the defendant.336 The
328. Cf Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
329. U.S. CONST. amend V.
330. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
331. Cf Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) ("There is no gainsaying that
arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.").
333. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
334. See, e.g., Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris, 401 U.S. at 222-26; Walder, 347 U.S. 64-65.
335. See, e.g., Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Harris, 401 U.S. at 222-26; Walder, 347 U.S. 64-65.
336. Intrusions into attorney-client relationships should be minimized because the relationship
is vital to the proper functioning of the adversary system. Cf. MICHAEL M. MARn, Lr AL., NEW
YORK EvIDENcE HANDEOOK: RuLEs, THEORY, AND PRACnCE § 5.2 (1997). ("[T]he privilege is a
recognition of the societal importance of privacy and the private attorney-client relationship.").
Id. at 333-34. Cf. Levine, supra note 207, at 818 (privilege fosters human dignity and individual
integrity).
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court should thus confine counsel's testimony to information that is nec-
essary and relevant to determine competency.337 As an additional safe-
guard, the defense attorney should not be compelled to be a witness
absent the court's determination that: (1) additional evidence concern-
ing the defendant's competency is required; (2) the defense attorney is
likely to have the necessary information; and (3) the prosecution is not
seeking to cause the disqualification of defense counsel. These safe-
guards, and the significance of correctly resolving the issue of compe-
tence, require that the attorney's testimony, including the disclosure of
client confidences, be closely regulated. The prosecution will not be
prejudiced by these restrictions because the information barred is infor-
mation to which it would not have otherwise been privy.338
D. The Rights of Impaired Defendants
In most jurisdictions, the incompetency doctrine provides only two
options: competence or incompetence. A finding of incompetence vir-
tually prevents the defendant from exercising any rights with respect to
the charges. 339 This has been a controversial matter.
Some commentators take the position that, under certain circum-
stances, defense counsel should be allowed to act for the client and not
be obligated to notify the court of a client's possible incompetence. 3 4°
The justification given for this posture is that the incompetency doctrine
denies incompetent defendants the rights to make case dispositive
motions, to obtain favorable plea dispositions, and even to be vindicated
at trial.34 1 Delay, pretrial confinement in conditions often worse than
jail, stigma, and the absence of professional treatment, or the effects of
337. Cf ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.8(b)(ii) (limiting cross
examination of the defense attorney); People v. Grisset, 460 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983).
338. Existing law answers prosecutorial concern about having trial evidence challenged as the
result of the attorney's statements. When a witness is granted immunity in exchange for grand
jury testimony, and is subsequently indicted, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that its
trial evidence did not originate from the witness' testimony or its fruits. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972). This same burden should apply to the prosecutor after a
competency hearing at which defense counsel or her client testifies.
339. Some jurisdictions provide for some rights to be exercised for the incompetent defendant.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) (allowing an attorney to contest any issue which could be
fairly determined without the personal participation of the defendant); see id. § 4.06(4) (permitting
an attorney to assert certain defenses). This sort of statute, however, is rarely used.
340. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 84. See Bonnie, supra note 27, at 566; Uphoff,
supra note 22, at 67, 98-108; ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING a CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 36-38
(Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995).
341. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 84. See Bonnie, supra note 27, at 566; Uphoff,
supra note 22, at 67, 98-108; ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 36-38
(Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995).
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such treatment, are offered in support of their contentions. 34 2 These
commentators claim that the lawyer acts paternalistically when she inter-
feres with the expressed choice of the client and that paternalism is bad.
Although paternalism is bad in many situations it can be justified when
necessary to properly resolve the competency issue of an impaired
defendant.343
The counter-argument is that increased participation by defense
counsel in competency proceedings will result in more competency eval-
uations and will increase the number of defendants found to be incompe-
tent. Assuming this to be true and recognizing that there is no panacea,
the importance of correctly determining a defendant's competency, prin-
ciples of agency and the limits imposed by the Constitution dictate the
adoption of the limited exception to the attorney-client privilege and the
ethical rules regarding disclosure of client communications.
Professor Bruce Winick advocates that defendants "impaired by
mental illness who, with the concurrence of counsel, clearly and volun-
tarily express the desire to stand trial or plead guilty" ought to be able to
waive competency determinations. 3 " Professor Winick challenges the
view that competence is "an essential prerequisite for waiver of rights in
the criminal process. '345 He also claims that one of the negative conse-
quences of the competency process, as it currently exists, is that client
autonomy is diminished. 346 His proposal substitutes the defense attor-
ney for the mental health professional and the judge as the decision-
maker.3
47
Under Professor Winick's proposal, the defense attorney becomes a
de facto guardian. As long as the lawyer agrees with the client's volun-
tarily expressed desire, she follows the client's instructions.348 If the
342. The possibility that delay resulting from the competency evaluation will hurt the
defendant's case has been raised as a concern. There are some criminal cases in which a prompt
trial would benefit the defendant. The prevailing wisdom among defense lawyers, however, is
that delay normally works in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Brown v. Warden, 682 F.2d 348,
353 (2d Cir. 1982) (the right to a speedy trial is not vigorously pursued by defendants). Witnesses
disappear, memories fade, the prosecutors interest diminishes or moves on to another case,
evidence grows stale, is lost or mishandled. Most of the time, the prosecutor's case is strongest at
the time of arrest when, for most crimes, the investigation ends. There are exceptions. For some
very serious or high profile crimes, the investigation continues. And, in some jurisdictions, the
investigation often continues at least to the extent the government is prepared to sign up
cooperators. See U.S. SENrEcING GuIDELINEs MANUAL § 5K.l (1995).
343. See Tremblay, supra note 4, at 523.
344. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 84. See also Bonnie, supra note 27, at 542-46
(analyzing Winick and discussing problems with his proposal).
345. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 84.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id. The meaning of "voluntarily" in this context is not satisfactorily explained. This
is troubling when one considers that the general standard for waiver-whether the defendant's
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lawyer disagrees with the client, a competency evaluation is ordered. 34 9
This result raises serious questions about defense counsel's role as an
agent, and has constitutional implications as well.35 0 Additionally prob-
lematic, is the lack of guidance given to the lawyer in determining
whether to concur with the client's expressed desire. Does Winick's
proposal involve an individualized assessment of the client's goals, or is
the underlying assumption simply that the client wants to "get off" or
"get off with as little time as possible?" 35'
Professor Uphoff has also suggested a role for defense counsel that
includes the right to determine whether to raise the issue of competency
in certain exceptional cases.352 Professor Uphoff makes a strong and
indisputable argument urging defense counsel to carefully assess the cli-
ent and consider all available options, including the client's choice,
before raising the issue of competency. 3  However, Professor Uphoff' s
proposal, like Professor Winick's proposal, requires the defense attorney
to act as de facto guardian, yet provides no guidance for assuming that
role.
Professor Richard Bonnie agrees with Professors Winick and
Uphoff that the information possessed by the criminal defense attorney
permits her to make reasonable judgments about the client's capacity to
rationally understand the charges against him and to assist in his
defense.354 Professor Bonnie proposes that the decision to raise the
issue of competency should be left to counsel, subject only to the Sixth
Amendment obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel.355
This proposal, like that of Professors Winick and Uphoff, sets forth no
explicit guidance for decision-making by the attorney. In addition,
defense counsel's representation will be virtually immune from review,
since the hurdle for proving an attorney's ineffectiveness under the
Strickland test is so high. 6
choice was made "knowingly and voluntarily" or was "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege"-seems to assume competence. See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
349. See WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 27, at 84. See also supra notes 134-37 and
accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 2, 3, 169, 174, and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
352. See Uphoff, supra note 22, at 67, 98-106; ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER, supra note 340, at 36-38.
353. See ETHIcAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER, supra note 340, at 32-
34. Before deciding whether to raise the competency issue, Professor Bonnie suggests that
defense counsel consult with another attorney or seek ex parte judicial review. See Bonnie, supra
note 27, at 564.
354. See Bonnie, supra note 27, at 565.
355. See id. at 566.
356. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under Strickland, the defendant
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Although Professor Bonnie is certainly correct in recognizing that
many defense attorneys resolve doubts about the client's competency
without judicial intervention,3 7 this fact cannot condone their conduct.
His proposal grants defense counsel too much power. Moreover, the
decision about an individual's competence should be made by the court
in an appropriate evidentiary hearing. As flawed as that process can
be,358 the competency determination is too important to be entrusted to
anyone else.
VII. CONCLUSION
The capacity of each participant in a judicial proceeding to present
favorable information is essential to the proper functioning of the adver-
sarial system of justice. Possibly incompetent defendants who are inca-
pable of rationally assisting defense counsel cannot fully participate in
the system. If a criminal case proceeds without a competent defendant,
confidence in the reliability of the outcome of the proceeding and
respect for the integrity of the system are lost. Because of the impor-
tance of competence, the criminal defense attorney should be permitted
to provide testimony, including disclosure of client confidences, con-
cerning competence. Only by permitting the defense attorney to testify
about her client's inability to rationally communicate and assist in his
defense, can the constitutional rights of incompetent clients be ade-
quately protected.
The competency process must distinguish between a defendant's
choices that are simply odd, and those which result from impaired
mental processes. A defendant who is irrational cannot be autonomous.
Contrary to the views of some commentators, permitting defense coun-
sel to act on behalf of the impaired defendant reduces individual auton-
omy because the attorney is actually making the choices. Paternalism is
not justified unless the client's ability to make rational decisions is
impaired. But separating defendants whose choices are merely different
from those whose decision making processes are impaired requires a
judgment that some criticize as being subjective. While not perfect, ill-
ness can be a valuable tool in making the judgment more objective.
Any damage inflicted on the attorney-client relationship and the
must show that defense counsel's errors were so serious that counsel was not functioning as
"counsel" and that the outcome is unreliable before being entitled to relief on ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds. The Court mandated that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential" and that defense counsel's conduct is "strong[ly]"
presumed to be "sound trial strategy." Id. at 689.
357. See Bonnie, supra note 27, at 558-59.
358. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991); Dusky v. United States, 271
F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959); Lagway v. Dallman, 806 F. Supp. 1322 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
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ethical rules is nominal when measured against the harm of trying the
incompetent defendant and the consequences of permitting the lawyer to
act without client authority. Given the significant values that compe-
tence exemplifies in our judicial system, it is more important for the
criminal defense attorney to disclose client confidences to insure that the
court does not try or proceed against the possibly incompetent criminal
defendant.
Finally, no provisions exist, in a criminal case, that enable defense
counsel to make primary decisions for the impaired client. Indeed, attor-
ney decision making for the impaired client tends to violate the defend-
ant's constitutional rights.
Moreover, failure to notify the court may constitute a fraud on the
court exposing the attorney to disciplinary actions. In effect, the imposi-
tion of conflicting duties to the court and to the client creates a quagmire
for the criminal defense attorney, which is in dire need of resolution.
